










Title of Document: BAYESIAN INFERENCE WITH 
OVERLAPPING DATA: METHODOLOGY 
AND APPLICATION TO SYSTEM 
RELIABILITY   ESTIMATION AND SENSOR 
PLACEMENT OPTIMISATION.   
  
 Christopher Stephen Jackson, Doctor of 
Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Reliability Engineering 
2011 
  




Contemporary complex systems generally have multiple sensors embedded at various 
levels within their structure. Sensors are data gathering mechanisms that measure a 
systemic quantity (such as functionality or failure) providing the engineer with a 
multitude of reliability information. When data sets are drawn simultaneously from 
multiple sensors in a system, they are said to be overlapping. Current methodologies 
focus on conducting system reliability analysis of non-overlapping data sets. We 
introduce a Bayesian methodology that allows analysis of overlapping data sets, 
exploiting their inherent inter-dependence to yield significant additional information. 
Data gathered from a sensor placed at the ‘top’ of the system (i.e. systemic 
functionality) is contextualised through dependence on data gathered simultaneously 
  
from any sub-system or component. A system that is functional in spite of a non-
functional sub-system infers information about the reliability characteristics of the 
clearly functional system remainder. The same principle extends to any other sensor 
that has subordinate sensors upon which it is observationally dependent. We apply 
overlapping Bayesian analysis on several example systems to highlight the 
information inherent in overlapping data sets and compare these results against 
previous methodologies that are constrained to non-overlapping data. The differences 
observed become errors if the incorrect methodology is used. 
The overlapping Bayesian methodology we introduce deals with on-demand and 
continuous life metric systems. The likelihood function for on-demand systems 
accommodates multiple degraded states and relies on an algorithm we introduce that 
rapidly generates combinations of disjoint cut-sets that imply the evidence. The 
likelihood function for continuous life-metric systems (such as those who failure 
probability is time based) incrementally examines each sensor data when 
contextualised through all other data sets. We generalise these likelihood functions 
for uncertain data, allowing simplification of the likelihood functions through real-life 
measuring inaccuracies. 
Finally, we use the methodologies developed above to assess probable information 
gain for various sensor placement permutations. We embed this process into a 
Bayesian experimental design framework that allows sensor placement to be 
  
optimised against information. This can then be fed into any multi-objective 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. OVERLAPPING AND MULTI-LEVEL DATA IN SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND 
RISK 
It is difficult to imagine contemporary complex systems (ranging from personal motor vehicles 
to nuclear power plants) that do not have multiple sensors embedded at various levels within 
their structure. Sensors are data gathering mechanisms that measure a systemic quantity, such as 
functionality or failure in the context of system reliability analysis. Technology has advanced to 
a stage where these sensors can be implanted relatively cheaply and effectively, thus providing 
the engineer with a multitude of functionality and reliability information. However, data sets 
gathered simultaneously from multiple sensors within the same system are unique: they are 
overlapping. 
Consider a system where a particular sensor has detected that a sub-system has failed. Without 
any further information (and from a diagnostics perspective only), inference can only be made 
about the ‘unreliability’ of that sub-system. If another sensor simultaneously detects that the 
entire system is functional, additional information is at hand: it is suggested that the remainder of 
the system is still functioning to an extent that mitigates the sub-system failure. From a 
prognostics perspective, system failure can now be more readily predicted as it is now 
completely dependent on the functionality of the remainder of the system only. But there is now 
information about the ‘reliability’ of the remainder of the system: information that when 




Correctly analysing these data sets, with their inherent dependencies, yields significantly more 
information. The inference made from data drawn from the system level sensor is dependent on 
data drawn from the sub-system level when drawn simultaneously. System functionality is 
conditional on the functionality of subordinate sub-systems and components. In this way, data 
sets drawn simultaneously from multiple sensors from the same system are overlapping and 
contain information through their inherent inter-dependencies and require specific analysis 
techniques. 
To instigate formal definition, sets of overlapping data are those that meet the following criteria: 
simultaneity (the sets are drawn from observations or demands that occur at the same time); and 
correspondence (the sets are dependent on the same system or process). A common example of 
overlapping data is that already introduced where reliability data is drawn from a particular 
system through multiple sensors simultaneously. At many points throughout this dissertation, 
comparisons are made between analysis of data sets as though they were either overlapping or 
non-overlapping to expose extremely significant differences. It is therefore crucial for the 
reliability engineer to understand what overlapping data is and how to analyse it.  
To date, the majority of system reliability data analysis methodologies can only analyse non-
overlapping data. A further observation of these techniques is that the since system reliability is 
a function of component reliabilities, system reliability analysis has been focussed on reliability 




system data (which is referred to as higher level data as it appears ‘higher’ in many visualization 
methodologies).  
Reliability analysis involves the ‘downwards’ propagation of information: test data can infer 
information ‘down’ into underlying reliability parameters (the term ‘down’ is used as it is 
common for component, sub-system and then system levels to be graphically represented 
hierarchically above reliability parameters). Reliability prediction involves ‘upwards’ 
propagation of information since reliability parameters (through reliability models and system 
logic) define higher-level performance. Component level testing is straightforward in that 
information can be propagated directly downwards into component reliability parameters. 
System and sub-system level data relies on system logic when information is propagated 
downwards, making analysis more complicated, especially when data is overlapping. This 
complexity presents not only challenges but opportunities: the fact that sensors embedded in 
systems infer information about many components can be judiciously exploited by the test 




1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The fundamental research objectives of this dissertation are as follows: 
a. To develop Bayesian frameworks and methodologies to allow analysis of overlapping data 
for (both binary and multi-state) on-demand systems and continuous life metric systems; 
b. To develop mathematical techniques and algorithms for rapid evaluation of all steps in the 
above methodologies; 
c. To generalise the above methodologies to incorporate uncertain data; and 
d. To combine the above methodologies with optimisation techniques to refine sensor 
placement within complex systems. 
1.3. TREATMENT OF NON-OVERLAPPING AND OVERLAPPING DATA IN 
BAYES’ THEOREM 
Bayes’ theorem is written formally as: 





















 where θ is the set of unknowns of interest or parameters, π0(θ) is the prior distribution of θ 
(representing the initial state of knowledge), L(E | θ) is the likelihood of observing a set of 
evidence, E, for a given θ, and π1(θ | E) is the updated posterior distribution of the set of 
unknowns of interest or parameters representing the updated state of knowledge. 
                                                 




1.3.1. Non-overlapping data. 
Non-overlapping data sets are ‘observationally’ independent and therefore generate independent 
likelihood functions. In the context of a complex system of n components where the vector, jp , 
that contains the probabilities of the jth component being in a particular functional state, and the 
set or matrix of n state probability sets for the system is 1 2 3{ , , ,..., ,..., }j n=p p p p p p     , Bayes’ 
theorem becomes:  
 { }( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
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 where {E1 , E2 , E3 , …} is a number of non-overlapping data/evidence sets. 
1.3.2. Overlapping data 
The likelihood functions for overlapping data are interdependent, and cannot be substituted into 
equation (2). They generate one encompassing likelihood function. Overlapping data is 
represented formally in Bayes’ theorem as: 
 { }( ) { }( ) ( ){ }( ) ( )
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 where { }1 2 3, , ,...E E E• • •  is a number of overlapping data/evidence sets. 
                                                 
2 Note that throughout this dissertation, a convention where a vectors are represented as x , and matrices as x will be 
observed. In this instance, p is a vector but will be annotated as a matrix to align with multi-state system 




As overlapping data sets are dependent, the overall likelihood function is not a product of 
individual data set likelihood functions. 
 { }( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 1 2 3, , ,... | | | | ...L E E E E L E L E L E• • • • • •= ≠ × × ×p p p p  ---(4) 
Effects of inter-dependent likelihood functions are examined in Example 1 and Example 2. 
 Example 1: Effect of Overlapping data 
Consider the basic two component series system examined in Figure 1 that is to a test regime 1:  
 
Figure 1: Basic two component series system 
Test 1.  A series of 10 demands where 10 failures were detected at the system level and 1 failure 
was detected by sensor #2. 
The effect of observing different numbers of failure at sensor #2 (for 10 systemic demands) are 
explored in Table 1 within the context of systemic failure on every demand. It can be seen that 
the number of failures detected by sensor #2 affects the level of inference that the number of 
systemic failures has on the failure characteristics of component 2. 
System (Sensor #1) 
1 
Sensor  #2 2 




















No of possible instances of 
component 2 failing 
Uncertainty in the 
behaviour of  
component 2 
10 
0 10 Specific  
1 9,10 (no uncertainty) 
2 8, 9,10  
3 7, 8, 9,10  
4 6, 7, 8, 9,10  
5 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10  
6 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10  
7 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10  
8 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10  
9 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10 Ambiguous 
10 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10  (total uncertainty) 
Table 1: Scope of inference on system (component 2) 
Example 2: Effect of Overlapping data – Simple time based system 
Consider a simple power module that involves two different and parallel transformer/filter sub-
systems. The system is represented in the reliability block diagram in Figure 2. There are two 
sensors that detect time to failure: sensor #1 for the entire system, and sensor #2 for sub-system 
A. It is assumed that the time to failure for each sub-system is exponentially distributed, with the 
prior distributions of µA and µB be (the means of each sub-systems’ time to failure) are 
uniformly distributed across [0,20] months. 





Figure 2: Reliability block diagram of power module 
Similarly, the respective probability density functions (PDFs) and cumulative distribution 
functions (CDFs) for the system and sub-systems are f(t | θ), fA(t | µA), fB(t | µB) and F(t | θ),  
FA(t | µA), FB(t | µB) where t is time. The system CDF and PDF are functions of the sub-
systems’ CDFs and PDFs.  
 F = FA•FB ---(6)  
as the system is a parallel configuration of sub-systems A and B, making systemic failure 
probability a product of sub-system failure probabilities  
 f = fAFB + fbFA … derivative of equation (6) with respect to t ---(7)  
Two evidence/data sets, in (8) and (9), are gathered from each sensor from three tests. 
 E1 = 1 {11.12,6.99,2.25}


















 E2 = 2 {11.12,6.99,2.23}
S =t … observed failure detection times of sensor #2 ---(9)  
Scenario 1: Treating the data sets in (8) and (9) as non-overlapping. This scenario is equivalent 
to testing the system in isolation three times and observing evidence set (8), and subsequently 
testing sub-system A in isolation three times and observing evidence set (9). Consequently, the 
analysis is unsure at what time sub-system A failed when system level evidence is gathered. The 
likelihood function of observing the evidence sets is based on equations (6) and (7):  
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Scenario 2: Treating the data sets in (8) and (9) as overlapping. If the data sets (8) and (9) were 
treated as overlapping, it would be equivalent to testing the system three times only and 
simultaneously observing the evidence sets. Considering the first test where both sensors 
detected failure at the same time (11.12 months), it can be concluded that sub-system B failed 
sometime before 11.12 months, with sub-system A subsequently failing at 11.12 months causing 
the entire system to fail (noting that it is a parallel system). The same principle is applied for the 
test where failure was detected by both sensors at 6.99 months in the second test. The third test 
involved sensor #2 detecting failure at 2.23 months, slightly before sensor #1 detects failure (at 
2.25 months). It can be concluded that in this test, sub-system A failed at 2.23 months, while sub-
system B failed at 2.25 months causing the entire system to fail. This illustrates the nature of the 
information inherent in overlapping data sets.  
The posterior distributions generated by Bayesian analysis treating the data sets as overlapping 
and non-overlapping are illustrated in Figure 3. The techniques required for analysing the data 
set as if it were overlapping are developed later in this dissertation. It can be seen that the 
primary difference between each posterior distribution is the information pertaining to sub-
system B: the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of µB when treating the data as non-
overlapping (3.98) is approximately double the MLE of µB when treating the data as overlapping 
(1.99). Conversely, the MLE of µA increases slightly (from 5.99 to 6.78).  It is clear that 
overlapping data does not infer the same information when it is analysed as non-overlapping 









Figure 3: Posterior distribution of sub-system failure rates of parallel system treating data as 
overlapping and non-overlapping. 
1.4. OVERLAPPING DATA ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS 
There are various systems that can be studied by the reliability engineer. On-demand systems are 
those that are subject to discrete demands or trials and will respond by operating (or existing) 
within certain discrete states. Binary-state on-demand systems have only two such states; failure 
and success (or functionality). By definition, on-demand systems are made up of on-demand 
components that also operate in the same two discrete states (noting that the maximum number 
of states each component can exist in is the number of system level states). The state that an on-
demand system or component exists in is a discrete random variable. The probability of the state 
of an on-demand system is a function of the component state probabilities, dictated by the system 
structure or logic. A methodology for the analysis of overlapping data sets for binary-state on-


























Multi-state systems are those where components can exist in states ranging incrementally in 
severity from ‘functional’ to ‘failed’. There will be one or more states of degraded functionality 
that a component can exist in. A binary-state system is the simplest form of a multi-state system. 
The method developed in Chapter 3 for the analysis of overlapping data sets generated by 
binary-state on-demand systems is generalized in Chapter 4 to accommodate multi-state systems. 
Both of the above methodologies require the generation of sets of combinations of state vectors 
that imply the evidence. The trivial approach to developing these sets (where each set is 
considered sequentially) is extremely computationally intensive, with huge numbers of possible 
combinations requiring examination. An algorithm is developed in Chapter 5 that rapidly 
compiles these sets, supporting the methodologies developed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Systems and components with continuous life metrics (such as time) contrast from their on-
demand counterparts in that the probability that they exist in a particular state (or transition from 
one state to another) is a function of said life metric. The point at which a component or system 
transitions from one state to another (measured in terms of the life metric) is a continuous 
random variable. There are numerous systems that are based on other continuous variables 
beyond time (such as distance and flow), and the methodology developed in Chapter 6 to analyse 
overlapping data sets (even though it is exclusively are based on time) is equally transferrable to 




1.5. UNCERTAINTY IN DATA 
A constant reality of data gathering is uncertainty. Chapter 7 deals with uncertainty in 
overlapping data sets, and examines how the methodologies developed in Chapters 3 to 6 can be 
modified to accommodate measurement error. A useful development for the case of systems with 
continuous life metrics is that the likelihood function required to deal with overlapping data sets 
is simplified significantly, and is a reality experienced by every system in this context. 
1.6. SENSOR PLACEMENT OPTIMISATION 
System sensor placement can come at significant resource costs, and possible sensor locations 
can be limited by the operating environment. The placement of sensors based on information 
optimality is necessarily complicated by many factors. By considering the issue of sensor 
placement as a holistic multi-objective optimization problem, sensor placement can be formally 
addressed.  
Bayesian analysis of overlapping data drawn from multi-sensor systems enables the concept of 
experimental design to be used to optimise sensor placement. The ability to correctly incorporate 
information inherent in overlapping data sets allows precise sensor placements to be analysed in 
terms of expected information gain. Chapter 8 deals with sensor placement optimisation in a 
Bayesian experimental design framework, with each permutation of possible sensor locations 
becoming a separate and distinct experiment. This allows informed decisions to be made on what 




Chapter 2: Review of the State of the Art 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Current system reliability analysis methodologies focus on using system failure logic (such as 
that represented in reliability block diagrams or fault-trees) to express system failure probability 
based on the failure probabilities of subordinate components. For example, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) Probabilistic Risk Assessment Guide breaks this process into 
defining component failure probabilities, determining system minimal cut-set probabilities and 
using them to quantify system reliability [1]. This procedure is replicated in many other relevant 
textbooks and handbooks. 
Higher level data is generally gathered by sensors placed throughout the system structure (a 
sensor can be a dedicated device or a person: the driver of a car will be instantly aware of the 
time at which it ceases to function). Whilst a sensor typically always exists at the system level 
(as in system failure can be immediately observed or detected), it may be desirable to place 
sensors elsewhere in the system to gather more diagnostic information. Each sensor does not 
form part of the system function, but can detect whether the system is functional at that point. 
Sensors are most applicable for sub-systems with their own functionality with failure becoming 





2.2. CURRENT METHODOLOGIES 
2.2.1. Binary-state on-demand systems 
The state variable for the jth component of a binary-state on-demand system, xj, is formally 
defined in equation (11). 
th
th
0 if the  component is functional








An approximate Bayesian method was considered through reliability block diagram 
methodology that combined non-overlapping system and component level data by Mastran and 
Singpurwalla [2]. A top-down approach combined system level data with component level data 
and prior distributions to update component life characteristics, which in turn provided a 
posterior distribution of system reliability. An alternate approximate Bayesian procedure based 
on a bottom-up approach with prior distribution parameters which were then combined with data 
was developed by Martz et al [3] and Martz and Waller [4]. 
Fully Bayesian techniques were developed by Johnson et al [5] and Hamada et al. [6] The latter 
technique involves beta prior distributions at the component level to incorporate test data of the 
form of k failures out of r demands to generate posterior component distributions. This allowed 
both upwards and downwards propagation of information but could not incorporate overlapping 
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where p is the set of n component failure probabilities {p1 , p2 , p3 , … , pj , … , pn},  Sip  is 
the ith system or sub-system failure probability expressed as a function of p, m is the 
number of system and sub-system probabilities under consideration (i.e. the number of 
sensors), the prior beta distributions of component failure probabilities have parameters α 
and β, and evidence is shown in Table 2. 
Component/System C1 C2 … Cn S1 S2 … Sm 
Number of detected failures k1 k2 … kn 1Sk  2Sk  … Smk  
Number of Demands r1 r2 … rn 1Sr  2Sr  … Smr  
Table 2: Expression of system level evidence for the Hamada et al method 
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For the Hamada et al method, it can be seen that all evidence must be of the form of k detected 
failures out of r demands. An example of an application of the method of Hamada et al for a 
basic system is illustrated in Example 3. 
The Hamada et al. method is computationally efficient to evaluate and should be used in 
scenarios involving non-overlapping data from binary-state on-demand systems. Graves et al. 
[7] generated a methodology that incorporates overlapping data for binary-state on-demand 
systems. It involves a four step algorithm primarily based on Boolean algebra and disjoint cut-set 
generation that satisfies overlapping multi-level data per demand. 
Example 3: Non-overlapping data analysis of a binary-state on-demand system 
Consider the basic two component on-demand series system in Example 1. The system level 
failure probability (or the probability of failure detection by sensor #1), 1
Sp , is defined in terms 
of the failure probabilities of components 1 and 2, (p1 and p2 respectively). In this case, the set of 
component failure probabilities, p, is {p1,p2}, noting that n = 2. 
Test 2. A series of 10 demands where 10 system level failures were detected by sensor #1 (sensor 
#2 was not involved). 
Firstly, assuming uniform prior distributions for the component failure probabilities and using 




through equations (14) and (15). 
 α1 = β1 = 1  and α2 = β2 = 1 ---(14)(15) 
There is no component level evidence, and accordingly k = r = 0 for each component. The 
system level evidence can then be expressed as 1
Sk  = 10 and 1
Sr  = 10. There is only one set of 
higher level data (the system level), and therefore m = 1. Substitution into equation (13)  yields: 
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 ---(16) 
The corresponding joint posterior distribution of p1 and p2 is illustrated below in Figure 4. It can 
be seen that from the data, the failure probabilities of p1 and p2 are likely to be high (i.e. close to 
1). This makes ‘conceptual sense’, as it is known the system has a high failure probability and 





Figure 4: Joint posterior distribution of p1 and p2 - Test 2 
(Returning to) Test 1.  A series of 10 demands where 10 failures were detected at the system 
level and 1 failure was detected by sensor #2. 
Data suggesting that component 1 has a low failure probability (1 failure from 10 demands) was 
gathered from sensor #2 concurrently with the systemic level data used in Test 2. The sensor 
level evidence can then be expressed as 1
Sk  = 10, 2
Sk  = 1 and 1 2
S Sr r=  = 10. This suggests 
‘conceptually’ that component 2 must have a very high failure probability to generate the high 
system level failure probability given that the data from sensor #2 suggests that component 1 is 
very reliable. The new posterior distribution is defined in equation (17). 
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The new joint posterior distribution of p1 and p2 is illustrated in Figure 5. The graph clearly 



















(i.e. the failure probability of component 2 is high). 
    
 
Figure 5: Joint posterior distribution of p1 and p2 -Test 1 
 
  
2.2.2. Multi-state On-demand Systems 
Multi-state systems are those where components exist in states that are classified by order of 
severity or degradation ranging from ‘functional’ to ‘failed’. Many systems exist where it is 
important to delineate between these states. Barlow and Wu [8] discuss the generalization of 
binary-state systems to multi-state systems. Graves et al [9] develop a fully Bayesian approach 
for incorporating multiple higher level non-overlapping data sets which is a generalization of 
their work in [6]. 
Each state of a multi-state system or component is represented by an integer from 0 to (z – 1), 
where z is the total number of possible states. The state ‘0’ denotes total functionality while the 
state ‘z – 1’ denotes total failure. Graves et al illustrate this in [9] by tabulating the possible states 
















Non-overlapping data Analysis 















 0 0 0 0 0 
- 1 - 1 - 
2 2 - 2 - 
3 3 3 3 3 
Table 3: An example of possible states of components 1 to 5 of a given multi-state system 
It can be seen in Table 3 that there are z = 4 possible states, but only some of the components can 
exist at all of them. The state ‘3’ (which is z – 1) denotes complete failure, and the state ‘0’ 
denotes complete functionality. Components 2 and 4 have a total of 4 possible states (including 
two degraded states that exist between complete functionality and complete failure), while 
components 3 and 5 have a total of 2 possible states. 
The state variable for the jth component is denoted xj, and defines the state at which the variable 
exists. Equation (18) is a multi-state generalisation of the binary-state state variable equivalent 





1 if the  component has completely failed                  
                             ...
1 if the  component is in the first degraded state






















 { }1 2 3, , ,..., ,...,j nx x x x x=x  … for a system with n components ---(19) 
Multi-state systems can be equally well represented graphically as binary-state systems through 
many methodologies including reliability block diagrams, fault trees and binary decision 
diagrams. These model representations are generally predicated on the rules that are represented 




Figure 6: Multi-state gate state variable relationships 
These basic rules form the core of multi-state system analysis and multiple tools exist for this 
purpose. Graves et al used the GROMIT algorithm [10] that generated mutually exclusive cut 
sets of component states for multi-state systems. This approach is illustrated in Example 4.  
 ● 
1 2 n … 
1 2 n … 
+ 
1 2 n … 
k/n 
State variable of AND gate  
minimum state variable of  
state vector elements, {x1 , x2 , … , xn} 
State variable of OR gate  
maximum state variable of  
state vector elements, {x1 , x2 , … , xn} 
State variable of K OUT OF N gate  
kth largest state variable of  




Example 4: Development of cut-sets for multi-state systems 
Consider the basic three component system illustrated in Figure 7, which includes a ‘2 out of 3’ 
gate to define the state of the top event. The allowable states of the three components are also 
listed in a table that is included in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Basic three component system with a ‘2 out of 3’ gate defining the top event 
The following mutually exclusive cut sets exist that define the top event: 
xTE = 0 … {x1=0 , x2=0};  {x1=0 , x2=1 , x3=0} ; {x1=0 , x2=2 , x3=0} ; {x1=0 , x2=3 , 
x3=0} ;  {x1=2 , x2=0 , x3=0} ; {x1=3 , x2=0 , x3=0} ---(20) 
xTE = 1 … {x1=0 , x2=1 , x3=3} ; {x1=2 , x2=1 , x3=0} ; {x1=3 , x2=1 , x3=0} ---(21) 
xTE = 2 … {x1=0 , x2=2 , x3=3} ; {x1=2 , x2=0 , x3=3} ; {x1=2 , x2=1 , x3=3} ; {x1=2 , 
x2=2} ; {x1=3 , x2=2 , x3=0} ---(22) 
xTE = 3 … {x1=0 , x2=3 , x3=3} ; {x1=2 , x2=3 , x3=3} ; {x1=3 , x2=0 , x3=3} ;  
{x1=3 , x2=1 , x3=3} ; {x1=3 , x2=2 , x3=3} ; {x1=3 , x2=3} ---(23) 





1 2 3 
0 0 0 
- 1 - 
2 2 - 
3 3 3 
 
Top Event 
State variable of  
2 OUT OF 3 gate  
2nd largest state variable of  




Each cut set is simply a particular state vector or set of state vectors. Each state vector above 
implies a certain top-event state. For example, the state vector {x1=0 , x2=1 , x3=3} implies  
xTE = 1. This is formally written as 
 { }1 2 30, 1, 3 1TEx x x x= = = = → =x  ---(24) 
Multi-state system analysis is not necessarily bound to the rules in Figure 6. For example, it may 
be desirable for the state of a gate to be described as the sum of the states of its subordinate 
components. In this instance, a basic two component system where the components exist in 
degraded states 1 and 2 respectively may imply that the system is considered to be in state 3 (the 
sum of states 1 and 2). To accommodate this, additional underlying rules and can be developed 
and mutually exclusive cut sets can be determined for each gate or system state. 
The probability of each particular state vector occurring is: 











= = = −∏ ∑px X  ---(25) 
where the probability of the jth component being in the xth state is ( )xjp , the set of (z - 1) 
state probabilities for the jth component is (1) (2) (3) ( 1){ , , ,..., }zj j j j jp p p p −=p  , the set of all n 
state probability sets for the system is 1 2 3{ , , ,..., ,..., }j n=p p p p p p     , and n is the number of 




The probability of a particular higher level state is given as: 
 ( ) ( )( ) Pr Pr   for all SS x S S Sp X x x= = = = →∑ X x x    
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= = − →∑ ∏ ∑ x  ---(26) 
The Bayesian methodology developed by Graves et al in [9] is a generalization of their previous 
methodology (that will be distinguished throughout this dissertation by being referred to as the 
Hamada et al method) in [6]. The Hamada et al method involves beta prior distributions of 
component failure probability and a likelihood function based on the binomial distribution 
(noting that this makes the prior distribution conjugate). The Graves et al method involves 
Dirichlet prior distributions of component state probabilities and a likelihood function based on 
the multinomial distribution (nothing that this also makes the Dirichlet prior distribution a 






1(0) (1) ( ) (0) (1) ( ) ( )0
( ) 0
0























where (0) (1) ( ){ , ,..., }Kp p p  are a set of non-negative random variables that satisfy  
(0) (1) ( )... 1Kp p p+ + + ≤  and (0) (1) ( ){ , ,..., }Kα α α  are a set of non-negative parameters. 
In the Graves et al method, the random variables equate to component state probabilities. 




variable (as defining K – 1 random variables defines the remaining one if it must always be the 
case that it ‘completes’ the sum to 1). Accordingly, the Dirichlet distribution used in the Graves 
et al method is a particular case of the Dirichlet distribution in equation (27) where the number 
of random variables, K, becomes z – 1 and (0) (1) (2) ( 1)1 ( ... )zp p p p −= − + + + . It can be observed 
that by definition, the Beta distribution a particular case of the Dirichlet distribution described 
above where z = 2. The Graves et al method is then written formally as: 
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where the prior Dirichlet distributions of the jth component state probabilities have 




System State No S1 S2 … Sm 
Number of observed system states 
0 01Sk ( )  02Sk ( )  … 0Smk ( )  
1 11Sk ( )  
1
2





… … … ... … 
z-1 11S zk −( )  
1
2





Table 4: Expression of system level evidence for the Hamada et al method 
For the Graves et al method, it can be seen that all evidence gathered at each sensor must be of 
the form of (0) (2) (3) ( 1){ , , ,..., }S S S S S zk k k k −=k observed states. An example of an application of 
the method of Graves et al for a basic system is illustrated in Example 5. 
Example 5: Non-overlapping data analysis of a multi-state on-demand system 
Consider the basic two component, multi-state on-demand series system in Figure 8. The 
system level state probabilities (at the sensor #1 level), (0) (1) (2) (3)1 1 1 1{ , , , }S S S Sp p p p  are defined in 
terms of the state probabilities of components 1 and 2, (0) (1) (2) (3)1 1 1 1 1{ , , , }p p p p=p  and 
(0) (1) (2) (3)
2 2 2 2 2{ , , , }p p p p=p  respectively. 
 
Figure 8: Multi-state two component series system 
System (Sensor #1) 
1 













The mutually exclusive cut sets for each state detected by sensor #1 are: 
 1 0
Sx =  …{x1=0 , x2=0} ---(29) 
 1 1
Sx =  …{x1=0 , x2=1} ---(30) 
1 2
Sx =  …{x1=0 , x2=2} ; {x1=2 , x2=0} ; {x1=2 , x2=1} ; {x1=2 , x2=2} ---(31) 
 1 3
Sx = …{x1=0 , x2=3} ; {x1=2 , x2=3} ; {x1=3} ---(32) 
Similarly for each state detected by sensor #2: 
 2 0
Sx =  …{x1=0} ---(33) 
 2 2
Sx =  …{x1=2} ---(34) 
 2 3
Sx = …{x1=3} ---(35) 
The system was subjected to a test of consisting of 10 separate demands with the gathered 
evidence shown in equations (36), (37) and (38). 
 Sensor #1:  (0) (1) (2) (3)1 1 1 1 1{ , , , } {2,1,4,3}
S S S S Sk k k k= =k  ---(36) 
 Sensor #2:  (0) (1) (2) (3)2 2 2 2 2{ , , , } {3,0,4,3}
S S S S Sk k k k= =k  ---(37) 
 Evidence,  1 2{ , , }
S S SE = k k r    ---(38) 




Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation. The resultant marginal distributions of each state 
probability are illustrated in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9: Marginal posterior distributions of each component state probability of system 
components in Figure 8 (using the Graves et al non-overlapping method). 
As with the Hamada et al method for binary-state on-demand systems, the Graves et al method is 
the most computationally efficient method of conducting Bayesian analysis of non-overlapping 
data sets for multi-state on-demand systems. This dissertation includes a discussion on the 
differences between overlapping and non-overlapping data, and will later outline a methodology 
that can incorporate both overlapping and non-overlapping data. 
2.3. AGGREGATION ERROR 
Using higher level data to form posterior distributions of higher level events is aggregate 
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resultant of many substituent component failure probabilities and the analysis considers the 
combined effects of these characteristics holistically. Conversely, using lower level data to form 
posterior distributions of higher level reliability parameters is disaggregate analysis (i.e. 
component failure data analysed to generate system reliability parameter posterior distributions). 
Any difference between the two forms of analysis is called aggregation error. Aggregation error 
implies that the system is not correctly understood and therefore the relationships between higher 
level and component failure probabilities are misrepresented. It is important to note that even if 
the system is represented incorrectly, Bayesian analysis will improve higher level posterior 
distribution (but not those of the component parameters) [11]. Aggregation error has been 
studied in the field of reliability by Mosleh and Bier [12] and further developed by Azaiez and 
Bier [13] with Bayesian reliability estimates. 
2.4. SENSOR PLACEMENT OPTIMISATION 
Literature whose subject is ‘sensor placement optimisation’ by and large refers to sensors being 
placed at various locations within a physical process or mechanism as opposed to a system. 
These sensors are intended to detect faults or failure mechanisms as opposed to improving 
understanding of component and system reliability. In the field of structural health monitoring 
(and primarily aimed with identifying damage in the form of material and geometric changes of 
physical structures such as bridges) sensor optimisation is used to measure structural fidelity. 
[14] Sensors are also placed in physical networks. Watson, Greenberg and Hart discuss the 
problem of sensor optimisation to provide protection from terrorist attacks. [15] Dhillon and 




There is significant literature on system sensor placement that focuses on improving diagnostics. 
The point of difference of the sensor placement methodology developed in this dissertation is 
that information of the unknowns of interest (the component reliability characteristics, or state of 
knowledge) is the metric of optimisation. 
2.5. SUMMARY 
The majority of current reliability analysis methodologies that deal with data sets drawn from 
various levels, locations or sensors within a system only consider said sets as if they are non-
overlapping. What this means is that (for example) if data was gathered simultaneously at the 
system and sub-system levels, traditional analysis limits inference based on an assumption that 
the data sets were gathered from distinctly separate test regimes. Chapter 2 has outlined many of 
the current methodologies that deal with non-overlapping data. 
Overlapping data sets contain inherent dependencies that when analysed correctly, yield 
information that would otherwise be misinterpreted if they were otherwise analysed. In a simple 
example, system level data is contextualised by sub-system level data gathered at the same time, 
and understanding each in conjunction with the other infers more information about all relevant 
components. Methodologies are developed in the following chapters which allow overlapping 




Chapter 3: Likelihood function of overlapping data of binary-state on-
demand systems 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Graves et al. [7] proposed a method that incorporates overlapping data for binary-state on-
demand systems. The methodology is based on a four step algorithm which relies on Boolean 
algebra and disjoint cut-set generation. As it considers each demand in isolation (i.e. sensor 
states for each demand must be known), the methodology cannot incorporate data that 
summarizes multiple demands on the system through a tallied number of states that each sensor 
detects. For the purpose of delineation, this methodology will be referred to as the Overlapping 
Graves Method. The methodology developed in this chapter allows overlapping data that is 
based on multiple demands of a binary-state on-demand system to be analysed in scenarios 
where the exact configuration of each sensor information vector (the states that each sensor 
detects) is not known for every specific demand. 
3.2. LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION OF BINARY-STATE ON-DEMAND SYSTEMS 
To develop the overlapping data likelihood function, permutations of possible instances of 
component failures that imply the observed evidence (and the probability of each permutation) 
need to be developed. The probability (or likelihood) of each permutation can then be substituted 




3.2.1. Step 1: State Vector Analysis 
All possible permutations of state variables for each component need to be analysed. Recall that 
the state variable for the jth component of a binary-state on-demand system, xj, is defined as: 
th
th
0 if the  component is functional








The state of all components in the entire system can be defined by the state vector: 
{ }1 2 3, , ,..., ,...,j nx x x x x=x  … for a system with n components ---(39) 
As there are multiple possible state vectors, the lth state vector (and its constituent component 
state variables) is written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2 3, , ,..., ,...,l j nl l l llx x x x x=x  ---(40) 
3.2.2. Step 2: Structure Functions 
Structure functions calculate the state of the system at sensor locations (i.e. at sub-system and 
system levels) based on the state vector. The structure function equates to 0 if the relevant 
sensor’s (sub-) system is functional and 1 if it has failed. 3 
                                                 
3 Many structure functions are used where ‘1’ denotes functionality and ‘0’ denotes failure. For ease of future 





( ) { }( )1 2 3 0 if the (sub-) system is functional, , ,... ,..., 1 if the (sub-) system has failed    
S S







As each component is binary-state, there will be 2n possible permutations and hence 2n possible 
state vectors. The probability of each state vector occurring can be calculated based on 
individual component failure probabilities, pj. 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1
1







 = −  
∏= pX x   ---(42) 
3.2.3. Step 3: (Sub-) System Failure Combinations 
The third step is to develop sets of combinations of r state vectors (recalling that r refers to the 
number of systemic demands in the data set) such that each combination generates the same 
number of detected failures as observed in the evidence set, 1 2{ , ,..., , }
S S S
mE k k k r= . It is important 
to note that the evidence set involves aggregates of failure detections for each sensor after r 
demands. Multiple evidence sets should not be combined into one aggregate set, as this 
represents a loss of information. For example, the evidence sets 1 1 1 2 1 1 1{( ) , ( ) ,..., ( ) , ( ) }
S S S
mE k k k r=  
and 2 1 2 2 2 2 2{( ) , ( ) ,..., ( ) , ( ) }
S S S
mE k k k r=  should be separately analysed, and not combined to 
evidence set 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2{( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ,..., ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) }
S S S S S S
m mE k k k k k k r r+ = + + + + . 
 { }1 2 2, ,..., ,..., nlv v v v=v  ---(43) 





The ath combination is defined by ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2 2, ,..., ,..., na la a a av v v v=v  ---(44) 
 where (vl)a is the number of occurrences of the lth state vector, lx , in the a
th combination.  
The probability of occurrence of the ath combination of state vectors, av , given a set of lower 
level component failure probabilities is defined in equation (45). 
( )Pr |a a= pv V ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )1 1 2 2Pr ,..., ,..., |n nl la a a a a av V v V v V= = = = p  
 
(which is simply a specific instance of the binomial distribution) 
 
















    … substituting (42) yields:  
 
( ) ( )















   = −  
   
∏ ∏   ---(45) 
Since each state vector is linked with a specific demand, the total number of state vectors in the 













Each different combination implies a different number of failures detected by each sensor. The 
number of failures detected by the ith sensor for the ath combination of state vectors, av , is 
defined in equation (47). 









= ∑ x  .... where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2 2, ,..., ,..., na la a a av v v v=v  ---(47) 
The matrix vE contains all combinations of state vectors that imply the evidence. If the ath 
combination of state vectors, av , implies the evidence set 1 2{ , ,..., , }
S S S
mE k k k r=  then it is an 
element of vE. For this to occur, the number of failures detected by each sensor implied by av  
must equal the number of detected failures in the evidence set, E. 
i.e. a E∈ vv  iff ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1




i i l i laE l
k k v i mφ
=




  ---(48) 
where ( )Si Ek  is the number of failures detected by the i




ik v  is the number of implied failures detected by the i
th sensor for the ath combination 
of state vectors, av . 
The likelihood function is the probability of observing the evidence, E, for a given instance of p. 
The likelihood function is based on ascertaining the combinations of state vectors that imply the 




 ( ) ( )Pr | Pr | ... for all that imply the evidenceE = ∑p pcombination of  state vectors  











    … substituting (45) yields: 
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Therefore, for a complex system with single occurrences of each component: 
 ( ) ( )












L E p p
v
 − 
∀ ∈ = =






3.3. COMPARISON WITH NON-OVERLAPPING DATA METHODS – BINARY-
STATE ON-DEMAND SYSTEMS 
The Hamada et al method cannot incorporate information inherent in overlapping data sets as 
shown in Example 6, which compares to the non-overlapping data analysis in Example 3.  
 Example 6: Overlapping data analysis of binary-state on-demand systems 
Consider the basic two component series system examined in Example 3 that was subjected to 
the first test regime:  
(Recalling) Test 1.  A series of 10 demands where 10 failures were detected at the system level 




The structure functions for the system at each sensor location are: 
 ( ) { }( ) ( )21 1 1 2
1
, 1 1S S j
j
x x xφ φ
=
= = − −∏x  ---(51) 
 ( ) { }( )2 2 1 2 1,S S x x xφ φ= =x   ---(52) 
Since there are two components (i.e. n = 2), the number of possible state vectors is 2n = 22 = 4. 
The state vectors are listed in Table 5, along with the states detected by sensors that they imply 









States detected by 
sensors Probability 
( )Pr |l= px X  (x1)l (x2)l ( )1S lφ x  ( )2S lφ x  
1 0 0 {0,0} 0 0 (1 - p1)(1 - p2) 
2 1 0 {1,0} 1 1 p1(1 - p2) 
3 0 1 {0,1} 1 0 (1 - p1)p2 
4 1 1 {1,1} 1 1 p1p2 
Table 5: State Vectors of system in Figure 1. 
Since there are 10 demands (i.e. r = 10), there are 286 possible state vector combinations, v , as 
each demand will invoke one of the 4 possible state vectors. A truncated list of combinations is 
listed in Table 6, along with the implied states detected by all sensors. There are only two 










State Vector Combination, av  Implied Evidence 
1 if a E∈ vv ; 0 
otherwise 
(no. of lth state vectors) 
(v1)a (v2)a (v3)a (v4)a 
Failures 
detected by 
sensor #1  
Failures 
detected by 
sensor #2  
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 9 1 0 0 1 1 0 
… 
65 0 1 9 0 10 1 1 
… 
121 0 0 9 1 10 1 1 
… 
285 0 0 1 9 10 9 0 
286 0 0 0 10 10 10 0 
Table 6: Possible state vector combinations of system in Figure 1. 
The normalized likelihood function given by equation (50) is substituted into equation (28) with 
uniform prior distributions to generate the posterior distribution plotted in Figure 10, along with 
the posterior distribution derived by the Hamada et al method. The normalized percentage error 
of the Hamada et al method is illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 10: Joint posterior distributions of p1 and p2 from Test 1 
Non-overlapping data Analysis 







































Figure 11: Percentage error in non-overlapping data likelihood function  
(maximum normalised error = 3.55 %) 
The overlapping posterior distribution illustrated in Figure 10 can fortuitously be replicated in 
this instance by the Overlapping Graves et al. Method. The evidence (10 demands, 10 systemic 
failures, 1 failure detected by sensor #2) is equivalent to one demand where the system fails and 
sensor #2 detects failure, and 9 demands where the system fails and sensor #2 does not detect 
failure. As failure detection for each demand is thus known, the Overlapping Graves et al. 
Method can be applied. 
The two posterior distributions in Figure 10 are approximately equal, with the normalized 
Hamada et al (non-overlapping) posterior distribution differing by less than 3.55 % from the 
normalised overlapping data posterior distribution. This good approximation is due to the nature 
of the evidence, E. The inference of the system level data contains a relatively small 
‘observational’ dependence on the inference of the sensor #2 data. Example 7 illustrates the 



























potential effect for an evidence set that contains a significant dependence between the data 
levels. 
Example 7: Non-overlapping and overlapping data analysis of an on-demand system. 
Consider the basic two component series system examined in Example 3 and  Example 6 
subjected to a third test regime:  
Test 3. A series of 10 demands where 5 system level failures were detected by sensor #1 and 5 
failures were detected by sensor #2. 
The evidence can be interpreted in two separate ways by considering it to be either overlapping 
or non-overlapping: 
Overlapping data. The implication of evidence set E is illustrated in Figure 12. In effect, 
component 1 has been observed to fail 5 times on 10 demands and component 2 has been 
observed to fail 0 times on 5 demands. 
 
Figure 12: Overlapping data Evidence 
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Non-overlapping data. The implication of evidence set E is illustrated in Figure 13. In effect, 
component 1 has been observed to fail 5 times on 10 demands whilst the system has separately 
been observed to fail another 5 times on 10 demands. This introduces additional uncertainty on 
both components, and will imply that component 2 has a higher likelihood of having a high 
failure probability. 
 
Figure 13: Non-overlapping data Evidence 
The normalized likelihood function given by equation (50) is substituted into equation (28) with 
uniform prior distributions to generate a posterior distribution plotted in Figure 14, along with the 
posterior distribution derived by the Hamada et al method. The normalised error associated with 
treating overlapping data as non-overlapping (i.e. the difference between the two graphs in 
Figure 14) are illustrated in Figure 15. 
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Figure 14: Joint posterior distributions of p1 and p2 from test 3 evidence  
The graph generated by the non-overlapping data analysis in the right of Figure 14 is more 
‘diffuse’ or less concentrated on a single set. This means that the overlapping data posterior 
distribution is significantly less uncertain, and hence contains more information. 
 
Figure 15: Percentage error in non-overlapping data likelihood function  
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Treating overlapping data as non-overlapping can also incorrectly imply non-existent 
information. Higher level data may become effectively redundant in the context of lower level 
data, which may mask information about some components. Treating the data as non-
overlapping may incorrectly imply information about these components in such instances. 
 Example 8: Non-overlapping and overlapping data analysis of a binary-state on-demand 
system. 
Consider the basic two component series system examined in previous examples that is subjected 
to a fourth test regime:  
Test 4. A series of 10 demands where 10 system level failures were detected by sensor #1 and 10 
failures were detected by sensor #2. 
The evidence can be interpreted in two separate ways by considering it to be either overlapping 
or non-overlapping: 
Overlapping data. The implication of evidence set E is illustrated in Figure 16. In effect, 
component 1 has been observed to fail 10 times on 10 demands (as every time sensor #2 detects 





Figure 16: Overlapping data Evidence 
Non-overlapping data. The implication of evidence set E is illustrated in Figure 17. In effect, 
component 1 has been observed to fail 10 times on 10 demands, whilst the system has separately 
been observed to fail 10 times on 10 demands.  
 
Figure 17: Non-overlapping data Evidence 
The normalized likelihood function given by equation (50) is substituted into equation (28) with 
uniform prior distributions to generate a posterior distribution plotted in Figure 18, along with the 
posterior distribution derived by the Hamada et al method. The normalized percentage error of 
the Hamada et al method is illustrated in Figure 19. 
System (Sensor #1) 
2 




and 2 unknown … 





10 instances of:  
component 1 
failure 
System (Sensor #1) 
1 
Sensor  #2 
2 
10 instances of: 











Figure 18: Joint posterior distributions of p1 and p2 from test 4 evidence  
 
Figure 19: Percentage error in non-overlapping data likelihood function  
(maximum error = 24.99 %) 
Since all demands generated failures that were detected at the system and sensor # 2 levels, the 
behaviour of component 2 is effectively hidden. As it is a series system, the success or failure of 
component 2 does not alter the data/evidence set. Accordingly, there is no information about 
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probability of component 2. The non-overlapping posterior distribution in Figure 18 suggests that 
a higher failure probability in component 2 is more likely. This information is has no base, and 
represents another inaccuracy when overlapping data is analysed as if it were non-overlapping. 
When there is only one data set (as in data is gathered from only one sensor), the data cannot be 
considered to be overlapping or non-overlapping. In this case, the Hamada et al and overlapping 
data methods generate identical likelihood functions. 
Example 9: Non-overlapping and overlapping data analysis of a binary-state on-demand 
system. 
Consider the basic two component series system examined in previous examples subjected to the 
second test regime:  
(Recalling) Test 2. A series of 10 demands where 10 system level failures were detected by 
sensor #1 (sensor #2 was not involved).  
The implication of evidence set E is illustrated in Figure 20. Whether the data is treated as 





Figure 20: Data Inference 
The normalized likelihood function given by equation (50) is plotted in Figure 21 along with the 
likelihood function derived by the Hamada et al method. 
 
Figure 21: Normalized likelihood functions of p1 and p2 from test 1 evidence (identical) 
The normalized percentage discrepancy between the two likelihood functions is due only to 
calculation errors that do not exceed 2.22 x 10-13 %. 
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3.4. MULTIPLE INSTANCES OF IDENTICAL COMPONENTS  
Apostolakis and Kaplan outline the nature of state of knowledge dependence through multiple 
instances of identical components. [17] The underlying failure probability of each identical 
component (i.e. components of the same component type) is the same, and modifies the 
likelihood function accordingly. The unknown of interest, p, then becomes the set of component 
type failure probabilities where n is the number of component types. The total number of 
components becomes n' (and therefore n ≤ n'). The component types are numbered 1, 2, 3, … , j , 
… , n, and the components are numbered 1, 2, 3, … , b , … , n'. The component type of the bth 
component is denoted jb. The likelihood function for a binary-state on-demand system is 
modified from equation (50) when there are multiple occurrences of the same component to 
equation (53). 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )











L E p p
v
 − 
∀ ∈ = =






where the unknown of interest, p = {p1 , p2 , … , pj , … , pn} is the set of n lower level 
component type failure probabilities, pjb is the failure probability of the b
th component 
(which is the failure probability of jbth component type), av  is the a
th combination of r state 
vectors (each state vector comprises of n' component states), (vl)a is the number of 
occurrences of the lth state vector in av  and (xb)l is the state variable of the b
th component 




Example 10: Overlapping data analysis of a binary-state on-demand system with multiple 
instances of the same component 
Consider a basic two component series system similar to that examined in previous examples. It 
is made up of two identical components of type A, and is illustrated in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22: Basic two identical component series system 
It is subjected to the following test: 
Test 5. A series of 10 demands where 3 system level failures were detected by sensor #1 and no 
failures were detected by sensor #2. 
As the data is overlapping, the implication of evidence set E is illustrated in Figure 23. In effect, 
component 1 has been observed to fail 0 times on 10 demands, and component 2 has been 
observed to fail 3 times on 10 demands. 










Figure 23: Overlapping data Evidence 
As components 1 and 2 are identical (i.e. the same component type), the evidence is equivalent to 
a single component of type 1 failing 3 times on 20 demands. When considering the equivalent 
evidence set E = {k = 3 ; r = 20}, the likelihood function is: 
 { }( ) ( ) ( )1731 1 1 1 13; 20 | 1 1r kkL E k r p p p p p−= = = = − = −  ---(54) 
The normalized likelihood function given by equation (53) is plotted in Figure 24, along with the 
likelihood function derived in equation (54). The normalized percentage discrepancy between the 
two methods below is due to computational errors and does not exceed 3.33 x 10-14 %. 
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Figure 24: Identical Normalized likelihood functions of p1 from test 5 evidence 
3.5. LIMITATIONS ON PREVIOUS METHODOLOGIES 
As discussed, the majority of existing methodologies can only deal with non-overlapping data. 
The only other methodology that deals with overlapping data, the Overlapping Graves et al. 
Method, can only deal with evidence where the sensor data is precisely known for each demand 
and is not aggregated. The method proposed in this chapter can deal with not only this form of 
evidence, but evidence in the form of multiple demands where aggregate numbers of failures are 
known for each sensor.   
Example 11: Limitation of the Overlapping Graves et al. method 
Consider the 4 component, 2 sensor system in Figure 25 that is subjected to a sixth test regime: 
Test 6. A series of 10 demands where 10 system level failures were detected by sensor #1 and 10 
failures were detected by sensor #2. 
Individual component data 
analysis for E = {k = 3 ; r = 20} 
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Figure 25: Three sensor on-demand system with paths of apparent influence indicated 
In this example, it is not known if all of the demands where sensor #2 detected failure coincide 
with system level failure, if all of the demands where sensor #2 detected failure coincided with 
system level success, or any permutation in between. The Overlapping Graves et al. Method 
requires the precise permutation of sensor data to be known for each demand, and hence cannot 
incorporate evidence or data of this nature. 
3.6. SUMMARY 
Whilst fully Bayesian methodologies have been developed to incorporate data at various levels 
within binary-state on-demand systems, the majority have been constrained to treat all data as 
non-overlapping. This ignores the dependencies between the overlapping data sets and 
effectively removes or misinterprets inherent information. An overlapping data likelihood 
function for binary-state on-demand systems was developed in this chapter that incorporates 












these inherent dependencies and generate the correct inference through Bayes’ Theorem. Several 
examples were developed to highlight the effect of the additional information overlapping data 
sets contain and how it can be used to correctly improve the state of knowledge (which in the 
context of binary-state on-demand systems is the set of component type failure probabilities). 
These examples included simple systems for the sake of illustration, but the methodology is 
equally applicable to complex systems. The flexibility of the likelihood function was also 
developed further to incorporate multiple instances of identical components. Through state of 
knowledge dependence, the resultant overlapping data Bayesian method completely incorporates 






Chapter 4: Likelihood function of overlapping data of multi-state on-
demand systems 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 outlined a methodology for Bayesian analysis of overlapping data from binary-state 
on-demand systems. A methodology is outlined in this chapter that generalises the likelihood 
function developed in the previous chapter for multi-state on-demand systems. 
4.2. LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION OF MULTI-STATE ON-DEMAND SYSTEMS 
The developmental steps for the overlapping data likelihood function of multi-state on-demand 
systems are identical to that for binary-state systems in that permutations of possible component 
states (and the probability of each permutation) need to be developed. The probability (or 
likelihood) of observing any one of the permutations that imply the observed evidence can then 
be substituted into equation (28). This is achieved using the three steps developed in Chapter 3. 
4.2.1. Step 1: State Vector Analysis 
All possible permutations of state variables for each component need to be analysed. The system 
state vector is defined in equation (39): 
 { }1 2 3, , ,..., ,...,j nx x x x x=x  … for a system with n components ---(39) 




As there are multiple possible state vectors, the lth state vector (and its constituent component 
state variables) is written as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2 3, , ,..., ,...,l j nl l l llx x x x x=x  ---(40) 
4.2.2. Step 2: Structure Functions 
Structure functions calculate the state of (sub-) system levels where sensors are located based on 
the state vector and is dependent on the system logic. The structure function returns the state of a 
higher level gate or sensor, and equates to (z – 1) if the relevant sensor’s (sub-) system has 
completely failed and 0 if it is fully functional.  
( ) { }( )1 2 3, , ,... ,...,S S Si i i j nx x x x x xφ φ= =x  
 
1 if the (sub-) system has completely failed    
                                    ...
1 if the (sub-) system is in the first degraded state






which is a generalisation of the binary-state equivalent developed in equation (41). 
There will be zn permutations and hence zn possible state vectors. The probability of each 
state vector occurring can be calculated based on individual component state probabilities. 
The probability of the jth component being in the xth state is denoted ( )xjp . The probability 















= = = −∏ ∑px X  ---(25) 
4.2.3. Step 3: (Sub-) System Failure Combinations 
The third step is to develop multiple combinations of r state vectors (recalling that r refers to the 
number of systemic demands in the data set) such that each combination generates the same 
number of observed states as the evidence set, 1 2{ , ,..., , }
S S S
mE r= k k k   , recalling that each vector 
(0) (1) ( 1){ , ,..., }S S S S zi i i ik k k
−=k  defines the number of states detected by the ith sensor. The inclusion 
of the number of demands, r, as a separate value in the evidence set, E, is technically redundant 
as the number of states that each sensor detects, expressed by Sk , sums to r for all sensors. 
 { }1 2, ,..., ,..., nl zv v v v=v   ---(56) 
where vl is the number of occurrences of the lth state vector, lx  ... which is a generalisation 
of the binary-state equivalent in equation (43). 
The ath combination is defined by: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2, ,..., ,..., na la a a z av v v v=v  ---(57) 
where (vl)a is the number of occurrences of the lth state vector in the ath combination ... 
which is a generalisation of the binary-state equivalent in equation (44). 
The probability of a particular combination of state vectors, av , occurring given a set of lower 




( )Pr |a a= pV v  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )1 1 2 2Pr ,..., ,..., |n nl la a a a a aV v V v V v= = = = p  
(which is simply a specific instance of the multinomial distribution) 
 






























   =   
   
∏ ∏   ---(58) 
which is a generalisation of the binary-state equivalent in equation (45) that utilised the 
binomial distribution. 
Since each state vector is linked with a specific demand, the total number of state vectors in the 







=∑  ---(59) 
which is a generalisation of the binary-state equivalent in equation (46). 
Each different combination implies a different number of states observed by each sensor. The 
number of xth states observed by the ith sensor for the ath combination of state vectors, av , is 
defined in equation (60). 
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The matrix vE contains all combinations of state vectors that imply the evidence. If the ath 
combination of state vectors, av , implies the evidence set 1 2{ , ,..., , }
S S S
mE r= k k k   , then av  is an 
element of vE. For this to occur, the number of states detected by each sensor implied by av  must 
equal the number contained in the evidence set. 
i.e.    ( ) ( ) iff    ...   1,2,3,...,
a
S S
a E i iE








where ( )Si Ek  is the vector of the number of states detected by the i
th sensor in the evidence 
set E, and ( )
a
S
i vk   is the vector of the number of implied states detected by the i
th sensor for 
the ath combination of state vectors, av , each element of ( ) a
S
i vk   being  defined by equation 
(60) ... all of which is a generalisation of the binary-state equivalent in equation (48). 
The likelihood function is the probability of observing the evidence, 1 2{ , ,..., , }mE r= k k k    for a 
given instance of p. The likelihood function is based on ascertaining the combinations of state 
vectors that imply the evidence, and then evaluating the probability of each combination: 
 ( ) ( )Pr | Pr | ... for all that imply the evidenceE = ∑p pcombination of  state vectors  











    … substituting (58) yields: 
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Therefore, for a complex system with single occurrences of each component: 














v∀ ∈ = =





 which is a generalisation of the binary-state equivalent in equation (50). 
4.3. MULTIPLE INSTANCES OF IDENTICAL COMPONENTS 
As with the case for binary-state systems explored in chapter 3, multiple occurrences of identical 
components are incorporated into the likelihood function using state of knowledge dependence. 
The underlying state probabilities of each identical component (i.e. component type) are the 
same, and modify the likelihood function accordingly. The unknown of interest, p, then becomes 
the set of component type state probabilities where n is the number of component types. The total 
number of components again is denoted n' (and therefore n ≤ n'). The component types are 
numbered 1, 2, 3, … , j , … , n, and the components are numbered 1, 2, 3, … , b , … , n'. The 
component type of the bth component is denoted jb. The likelihood function of a multi-state on-
demand system with multiple occurrences of the same component is equation (64). 
( ) ( )












v∀ ∈ = =
     ∝   






where (( ) )b l
b
x
jp  is the probability of the b
th component being in the (xb)lth state, n' is the 
number of components in the system and (xb)l is the state variable of the bth component in 




4.4. COMPARISON WITH NON-OVERLAPPING DATA METHODS – MULTI-
STATE ON-DEMAND SYSTEMS 
The Graves et al. method cannot incorporate information inherent in overlapping data sets as it is 
limited to treating data as non-overlapping. Non-overlapping data sets contain no such 
dependence, and therefore there is no information inherently stored in this way. The Graves et al. 
method is faster to evaluate as it does not involve generation of combinations. Whenever 
analysis only involves non-overlapping data, the Graves et al. method should be employed. 
Example 12: Overlapping data analysis of a multi-state on-demand system 
Consider the basic two component series system examined in Example 5 that was subjected to 
the same test regime with the same evidence. The structure functions for the system at each 
sensor location are: 
 ( ) { }( )1 1 1 2 1 2, max( , )S S x x x xφ φ= =x  ---(65) 
 ( ) { }( )2 2 1 2 1,S S x x xφ φ= =x   ---(66) 
Since there are two components (i.e. n = 2) and four possible states (i.e. z = 4), the number of 
possible state vectors is zn = 42 = 16. The truncated list of state vectors is in Table 7, along with 





State Vector # 
l 
Component States State Vector 
lx  
States detected by 
sensors Probability ( )Pr |l= px X  (x1)l (x2)l ( )1S lφ x  ( )2S lφ x  
1 3 3 {3,3} 3 3  (3) (3)1 2p p  
2 3 2 {3,2} 3 3 (3) (2)1 2p p  
3 3 1 {3,1} 3 3 (3) (1)1 2p p  
4 3 0 {3,0} 3 3 (3) (0)1 2p p  
5 2 3 {2,3} 3 2 (2) (3)1 2p p  
… 
12 1 0 {1,0} 1 1 (1) (0)1 2p p  
13 0 3 {0,3} 3 0 (0) (3)1 2p p  
14 0 2 {0,2} 2 0 (0) (2)1 2p p  
15 0 1 {0,1} 1 0 (0) (1)1 2p p  
16 0 0 {0,0} 0 0 (0) (0)1 2p p  
Table 7: Truncated list of state vectors of system in Figure 1. 
Since there are 10 demands (i.e. r = 10) there are 3 268 760 possible state vector combinations, v
, as each demand will invoke one of the 16 possible state vectors. A truncated list of 
combinations is listed in Table 8, along with the implied sensor detection states. There are 600 
possible combinations that imply the evidence. The method in which they are compiled is the 
subject of chapter 5. 
The posterior distribution of the component state probabilities was evaluated using Markov-
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation. The resultant marginal distributions of each state 




distributions generated by the Graves et al. (non-overlapping) method in Example 5. 
 
State Vector  



























(v1)a 0 0 … 0 0 … 9 10 
(v2)a 0 0 … 0 0 … 1 0 
(v3)a 0 0 … 0 0 … 0 0 
(v4)a 0 0 … 3 3 … 0 0 
(v5)a 0 0 … 0 0 … 0 0 
(v6)a 0 0 … 0 0 … 0 0 
(v7)a 0 0 … 0 1 … 0 0 
(v8)a 0 0 … 4 3 … 0 0 
(v9)a 0 0 … 0 0 … 0 0 
(v10)a 0 0 … 0 0 … 0 0 
(v11)a 0 0 … 0 0 … 0 0 
(v12)a 0 0 … 0 0 … 0 0 
(v13)a 0 0 … 0 0 … 0 0 
(v14)a 0 0 … 0 0 … 0 0 
(v15)a 0 1 … 1 1 … 0 0 
























 0 10 9 … 2 2 … 0 0 
1 0 1 … 1 1 … 0 0 
2 0 0 … 4 4 … 0 0 















 0 10 10 … 3 3 … 0 0 
1 0 0 … 0 0 … 0 0 
2 0 0 … 4 4 … 0 0 
3 0 0 … 3 3 … 10 10 
1 if a E∈ vv ; 
0 otherwise 
0 0 … 1 1 … 0 0 





Figure 26: Marginal posterior distributions of each component state probability of the system in 
Figure 1 (the distributions coloured grey are those derived by the Graves et al. method illustrated 
in Example 5). 
Figure 26 illustrates a marked difference between the posterior distributions produced by the 
Graves et al and overlapping data methods. The reason for this discrepancy stems from the 
nature of overlapping data, and is explored in Figure 27 and Figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 27: Evidence inferred information when considered as non-overlapping 




Sensor #1 detecting: 
2 x states 0 (complete functionality) 
1 x state 1 
4 x states 2 
3 x states 3 (complete failure) 
1 
Sensor  #2 
1 
Sensor #2 detecting: 
3 x states 0 (complete functionality) 
0 x states 1 
4 x states 2 
3 x states 3 (complete failure) 
Components 1 and 2: 
equivalent uncertainty of 
more than 0 but less than 10 
demands. 
Component 1:  
equivalent uncertainty 
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
component 2 state probabilities,  2p   
State #2, p(2) 
State #3, p(3) 




When treated as overlapping, the data sets above cannot achieve the separation as illustrated in 
Figure 27 but is represented in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28: Evidence inferred information when considered as overlapping 
Whilst entropy estimates for each marginal posterior distribution have been calculated and 
shown in Table 9, it is useful to consider the ‘amount of inference’ that each evidence set imparts 
on each component. For example, a component subjected to 10 demands can be said to have the 
‘equivalent uncertainty inferred by 10 demands’. However, a two component system has 
information ‘shared’ between components, and therefore each component has the ‘equivalent 
uncertainty inferred by more than 0 but less than 10 demands’. 
Even though the characteristics of sensor #1 evidence are a function of both component 1 and 2, 
the fact that sensor #2 information exists means that the uncertainty implied by sensor #1 
evidence is not ‘shared’ between components and is directly imparted onto component 2. A 
summary of the level of information inferred by the evidence is listed in Table 9. 




Sensor #1 detecting: 
2 x states 0 (complete functionality) 
1 x state 1 
4 x states 2 
3 x states 3 (complete failure) 
1 
Sensor  #2 
Sensor #2 detecting: 
3 x states 0 (complete functionality) 
0 x states 1 
4 x states 2 
3 x states 3 (complete failure) 
Component 2:  
equivalent uncertainty of  
10 demands. 
Component 1:  
equivalent uncertainty 
of 10 demands. 





 State Prob. 





















-1.8114 10-20 (total) -1.5029 10 
The lower marginal 
entropies and equivalent 
uncertainty shows that 
component 1 
characteristics have less 











 (1)2p  
-2.3099 0-10 -2.6852 10 
The (generally) higher 
marginal entropies and 
equivalent uncertainty 
shows that component 1 
characteristics have more 







Table 9: Comparison of data inference when data is constrained to be non-overlapping (Graves 
et al. method) versus overlapping (downwards inference) for analysis of system examined in 
Example 12. 
A marked difference in the posterior distributions inferred by the same evidence when 
considered to be non-overlapping versus overlapping can be clearly observed. Treating 
overlapping data as non-overlapping incorrectly increases the amount of apparent information 
for the characteristics of some components in some instances, and conversely incorrectly 





The solution of the overlapping data likelihood function in equations (53) and (64) cannot easily 
be carried out by hand even for small systems, and a detailed algorithm (which is the subject of 
chapter 5) is required for systems of moderate to high complexity. The speed of evaluation is 
largely dependent on the generation of possible state vectors for the system in question and then 
identification of all combinations of those state vectors that imply the evidence. Once the state 
vector combinations are developed, the likelihood function is easily calculated. It must be 
repeated here that should the data for analysis be non-overlapping in nature, the Graves et al. 
method should be used to save computational time. 
4.6. SUMMARY 
Whilst fully Bayesian methodologies have been developed for data at various levels within on-
demand systems, they generally constrain data to be treated as non-overlapping. The only 
previous methodology to incorporate overlapping data is limited to binary-state on-demand 
systems, with additional limitations discussed in chapter 3. This chapter detailed the generation 
of the likelihood function for overlapping data analysis of multi-state on-demand systems, which 
is a generalisation of the likelihood function developed in chapter 3. An example was included to 
highlight the effect of the additional information overlapping data contains, how this information 
can be used to correctly improve our state of knowledge (which is the set of component type 
failure probabilities) and how analysing overlapping data as non-overlapping sometimes 




overlapping data Bayesian method completely incorporates all information and evidence that 






Chapter 5: Downwards Inference Algorithm: Evaluation of overlapping 
data likelihood function of on-demand systems 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION  
The likelihood functions for both binary-state and multi-state on-demand systems developed in 
chapters 3 and 4 are centred on the generation of a set of combinations of state vectors that infer 
the observed evidence, and then evaluating the summed probability of observing any one of 
these possible combinations (noting that they are mutually exclusive). The number of possible 
combinations that must be considered increases exponentially as the number of components and 
possible states increases, significantly affecting computational time. An algorithm is outlined in 
this chapter that allows rapid compilation of this set of combinations of state vectors and hence 
rapid analysis of the likelihood function for subsequent Bayesian analysis.  
5.2. MULTI-STATE ON-DEMAND COMPLEX SYSTEMS: LIKELIHOOD 
FUNCTION  





( ) ( )












v∀ ∈ = =
     ∝   






where n is the number of component types, n' is the number of components in the system, 
the unknown of interest, 1 2 3{ , , ,..., ,..., }j n=p p p p p p     is the set of n lower level component 
state probability sets for z states, { }(1) (2) (3) ( 1), , ,..., zj j j j jp p p p −=p  is the state probability 
vector of the jth component, (( ) )b l
b
x
jp  is the probability of the b
th component (which is the jbth 
component type) being in the (xb)lth  state, r is the number of demands in the data/evidence 
set E, av  is the a
th combination of r state vectors (each state vector comprises of n' 
component states), vE is the set of all av  that imply the data/evidence set E, (vl)a is the 
number of occurrences of the lth state vector in av  and (xb)l is the state variable of the b
th 
component in the lth state vector. 
The generation of vE, the set of combinations of state vectors that imply the evidence, is the most 
computationally intensive part of developing a likelihood function. The vector v  can be 
described as a combination of zn' possible state vectors or a permutation of the number of 
occurrences of each possible state vector, '1 2, ,..., ,..., nl zv v v v . The trivial method of generating vE 
involves considering every possible combination of zn' possible state vectors, which is equivalent 
to considering every possible permutation of ( '1 2, ,..., ,..., nl zv v v v ). The number of possible 





















The number given in equation (67) can become prohibitively large to allow combinations to be 
individually considered for even moderately complex systems. One of the reasons is that it is 
exponentially dependent on the number of components, n'. The process of evaluating the 
likelihood function in equation (64) is illustrated in Figure 29. It introduces the sensor 
information vector, which is simply the vector of states observed be all sensors and can be 
expressed in terms of structure functions of the component state vector, x . 
i.e. Sensor information vector = { } ( )1 2, ,..., ,...,S S S S S Si mx x x x= =x x φ  ---(68)  
where Six  is the state detected by the i
th sensor, Siφ  is the structure function of the i
th sensor 
such that ( )S Si ix φ= x  and Sφ  is the vector of the structure functions for all sensors such 
that S =φ 1 2{ , ,..., ,..., }
S S S S
i mφ φ φ φ . 
The number of combinations can be limited by considering sensor information vectors as 
opposed to component state vectors because each sensor information vector has an associated 
probability that can be evaluated. If m is the number of sensors, the number of possible 
combinations of sensor information vectors in equation (69) is significantly less than that in 
















To save computational time, the set of sensor information vector combinations that imply the 




sets compiled that will then allow the probability of each sensor information vector combination 
to be calculated. The resultant likelihood function is given in equation (70). 
( )





































= →∑ p x x  which is the sum of the probabilities of each cut set 
that implies the lth sensor information vector, Slx , 
S
av  is the a
th combination of sensor 
information vectors such that 1 2{( ) , ( ) ,..., ( ) ,..., ( ) }n
S S S S S
a a a l a azv v v v=v , ( )
S
l av  is the number of 
occurrences of the lth sensor information vector in the ath combination, lmax is the number 
of possible sensor information vectors and SEv  is the set of all 
S
av  that imply the evidence. 
 



















Set of state vector 
combinations  
that imply evidence 
vE 
Set of state vector 
combinations  
that do not imply evidence 
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Set of sensor 
information vector 
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that do not imply 
evidence 
( )|L E p
Cut Set Generation 
Algorithm Sensor 








These two processes have two separate algorithms developed in the remainder of this chapter. 
5.3. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION: EVIDENCE AS A FUNCTION OF 
SENSOR INFORMATION VECTORS 
Formal evaluation of equations (64) and (70) through the processes illustrated in Figure 29 
requires evidence to be expressed as a function of state vectors. This is best achieved through 
matrix representation: 
 Sa• =M v E  ---(71) 
where matrix M is defined in equation (74) and represents the relationship between Sav , the 
ath combination of sensor information vectors defined in equation (72), and the evidence 








where ( )  is the number of times the
...  

































  ---(72) 
The evidence vector, E , contains the sequentially listed number of detections of each of the z 






'0 states' detected by sensor #1
 '( -1) states' detected by sensor #1
...
'0 states' detected sensor #
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The matrix M is a (m × z) by lmax matrix (where lmax is the number of possible sensor 
information vectors). Each element, Mi,l is either 0 or 1 and relates the effect that the lth sensor 
information vector has on each element of the evidence vector, E . The entire system is therefore 





1,1 1,2 1, 1,
2,1 2,2 2, 2,
[ ( 1)] 1,1 [ ( 1)] 1,2 [ ( 1)] 1, [ ( 1)] 1,
( ),1 ( ),2 ( ), ( ),
S S S S
i i i i
l l
l l
z i x z i x z i x l z i x l
m z m z m z l m z l
M M M M
M M M M
M M M M
M M M M
− + + − + + − + + − + +
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Example 13: Matrix equation of sensor information vectors 
Consider the basic two component series multi-state system that is illustrated in Figure 30. There 
are four allowable states (i.e. z = 4) which are 0 (complete functionality), 1 (1st degraded state), 2 
(2nd degraded state) and 3 (complete failure). 
 
Figure 30: Multi-state two component series system 
As the system is a series system, the state detected by sensor #1 must be greater than or equal to 
the state detected by sensor #2. There are 10 possible sensor information vectors and hence lmax = 
10. The set of 10 possible sensor information vectors is listed in equation (75). 
 
3 5 6 7 8 9 101 2 4
1
2
... 0 1 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 3
    , , , , , , , , ,
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 3...





 =                      ⇒                     
=                      
        
         
x x x x x x xx x x
 ---(75) 
Evidence is of the form of the number of observed states at each sensor from r demands.  
 Sensor #1:  (0) (1) (2) (3)1 1 1 1 1{ , , , }
S S S S Sk k k k=k  ---(76) 
 Sensor #2:  (0) (1) (2) (3)2 2 2 2 2{ , , , }
S S S S Sk k k k=k  ---(77) 
 Evidence,  E = { 1
Sk  , 2
Sk  , r} ---(78) 
System (Sensor #1) 
1 





The performance of the system is described by a combination of r sensor information vectors 
from the set in equation (75). The number of occurrences of the sensor information vector Slx  is 
S
lv . The number of times the sensor #1 detects a ‘0’ state for the a
th combination of sensor 
information vectors, Sav , is the sum of all sensor information vectors in the combination where 
1
Sx  = 0 (which is only the first sensor information vector, 1
Sx ).  
i.e. 01 1
Sk v=  ---(79) 
The number of times the sensor #1 detects a ‘1’ state for the ath combination of sensor 
information vectors, Sav , is the sum of all sensor information vectors in the combination where 
1
Sx  = 1 (which is only the 2nd and 5th sensor information vectors, 2
Sx and 5
Sx ). 
i.e. 11 2 5
S Sk v v= +  ---(80) 
This process is repeated and sets up a total of (z × m) simultaneous equations that can be 























1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0








































The matrix equation (81) of the form Sa• =M v E  summarizes the relationship between a 
combination of r sensor information vectors and the evidence it implies. 
5.4. DOWNWARDS INFERENCE – COMBINATION GENERATION ALGORITHM 
To evaluate equation (70), the set of combinations of sensor information vectors that imply the 
evidence need to be compiled. These combinations are of the form: 
 { }max1 2, ,..., ,...,
S S S S S
l lv v v v=v  ---(82) 
where Slv  is the number of occurrences of the l
th
 sensor information vector, Slx  in the 




The combination generation algorithm proposed below allows for rapid compilation of such sets, 
and involves the following steps.  
5.4.1. Step 1: Generation of Constraints.  
The set of requirements that each combination must satisfy is subsequently referred to as 
constraints (such as ‘ Sv  must imply the evidence’). Another constraint is that the sum of all vl 
values must equal the number of demands, r. There are two types of constraints: 
a. Partial (optional, but will greatly speed computation). Partial constraints are those that 
apply to combination sub-sets 1 2{ , ,..., }
S S S
lv v v  … l < lmax.  If any combination sub-set 
violates a constraint, then all complete combinations that contain that sub-set can be 
discarded. 
b. Total. Total constraints are those that apply to complete combinations 
max1 2{ , ,..., ,..., }
S S S S
l lv v v v  (i.e. the completely defined combination). 
5.4.2. Step 2: Identification of common Slv  values (optional).  
The constraints may limit certain instances of Slv  to specific values. By identifying these 
instances where Slv  has a certain common value throughout all possible combinations, the 




computational requirements. One of two possible conditions must be met for common Slv  values 
to exist: 
a. Null Slv  values. If the evidence set involves any values for which 
( )SiS x
ik  = 0, then all non-
zero elements of the matrix M on the th([ ( 1)] 1)Siz i x− + +  row imply that the number of 
occurrences of the relevant sensor information vectors, Slv , must also be zero (where l is 
the column number of all non-zero elements). 
i.e. if ( )S xik  = 0 → 
S
lv  = 0 for all l such that ([ ( 1)] 1),Siz i x lM − + +  = 1. ---(83) 
b. Trivial Slv values. If the 
th([ ( 1)] 1)Siz i x− + +  row of the matrix M only has one non-zero 
value (at the element 
([ ( 1)] 1),Siz i x l
M
− + +
), then the number of lth sensor information vectors 





([ ( 1)] 1),Siz i x l
M
− + +
 = 1 and ∀ 
([ ( 1)] 1),Siz i x l
M
− + + ≠
 = 0 → Slv  = 
( )Six
ik  ---(84) 
For each common Slv  value, the matrix M and vectors E  and 
S





















































































1,1 1, 1 1, 1 1,
2,1 1, 1 2, 1 2,
[ ( 1)] 1,1 [ ( 1)] 1, 1 [ ( 1)] 1, 1 [ ( 1)] 1,
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 removing the lth column where Slv  is the identified common value. 
and ' Slr r v= −  ---(88) 
Should the matrix M' have rows where all elements are zero, then that row (along with the 
corresponding row in the evidence vector E ') is removed. If the row in E  that is removed in this 










1,1 1,2 1, 1,
2,1 2,2 2, 2,
1,1 1,2 1, 1,
1,1 1,2 1, 1,
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After each cycle, M becomes M', E  becomes E ', Sav  becomes 
S
av ', and r becomes r'. The 
process is repeated iteratively until the conditions in (83) and (84) can no longer be satisfied (i.e. 
no more common Slv  values exist). 
5.4.3. Step 3: Setting minimum and maximum Slv  values.  
One of two possible approaches must be used to establish minimum and maximum Slv  values: 
a. Trivial. All remaining Slv  values are assigned values of 0 and r as minimum and maximum 




{min1 , min2 , … , minl , … , maxminl } = {0 , 0 , … , 0 , … 0} ---(91) 
{max1 , max2 , … , maxl , … , maxmaxl } = {r , r , … , r , … , r} ---(92) 
b. Theoretical (optional, but will greatly speed computation). For a given partial combination 
sub-set 1 2{ , ,..., }
S S S
lv v v  … l < lmax, 1
S
lv +  has minimum and maximum values derived from 
constraints. The number of subsequent possible combinations is reduced, thereby 
decreasing computational time. The estimates can be improved iteratively as follows: 



























































Note: The less than or equals to (≤) and greater than or equals to (≥) signs in inequalities (93) 
and (94) are used to indicate the relationship between all equivalent elements on both the left 
and right hand sides (i.e. all elements of the resultant vector on the left hand side of (93) ‘≥’ 
must be greater than or equal to all elements of the vector E  for the inequality hold). 





5.4.4. Step 4: Generation of combinations - ‘Sideways consideration / Upwards 
generation’. 
The final process is using the remaining undefined values of Slv  and their associated minimum 
and maximum values to generate a set of all combinations that meet the constraints. This is done 
sequentially in sub-sets 
max1 2{ , ,..., ,..., }
S S S S
l lv v v v  for l = 1,2, … , lmax  (i.e. sideways consideration) 
for each possible remaining combination (i.e. upwards generation). Depending on the nature of 
the set or sub-set under consideration, accepting and rejecting occurs as follows: 
a. Combination Sub-sets 1 2{ , ,..., }
S S S
lv v v  … l < lmax. Combination sub-sets are tested against 
partial criteria. Partial combination sub-sets that meet partial criteria indicate potential 
for the remaining undefined values of 
max1 2{ , ,..., }
S S S
l l lv v v+ +  to imply the evidence. If any one 
partial criterion is not met, then all combinations that contain that particular sub-set are 
invalid. This significantly reduces the number of combinations that subsequently need to 
be considered, reducing computational time. 
b. Total combinations
max1 2{ , ,..., }
S S S
lv v v . Total combinations are tested against total criteria. 
Total combinations that meet total criteria imply the observed evidence. If they do, then 
that particular combination is added to the set of combinations that imply the evidence. 





Figure 31: Representation of ‘sideways consideration / upwards generation’ combination 
algorithm 
By identifying infeasible values of Slv , large fractions of combinations which have that particular 
combination sub-set can be excluded from consideration. The earlier this occurs (i.e. the closer l 
is to 1), the larger the numbers of combinations that can be excluded. This significantly 
































Sv = {r , … , r , r} 
Sv = {r , … , r , 1} 
: 
Sv = {r , … , r , 0} 
: 
Sv = {0 , … , 0 , r} 
Sv = {0 , … , 0 , 1} 
: 





Sv  = {0 , … , 0 , 0}, 
the value  
max 1
S
lv −  = 0 was 
found to be 
infeasible by 
testing the partial 
combination sub-
set against partial 
criteria. Therefore, 
all subsequent 
values of Slv  do 
















Figure 32: Downwards Inference Combination Generation Algorithm Flow-Chart  
(‘sideways consideration / upwards generation’) 
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Example 14: Solving matrix equation of sensor information vectors 
Consider the same two component series system in Example 13. The system was subjected to 10 
demands (i.e. r = 10) and the following evidence was obtained: 
 Sensor #1:  { } { }(0) (1) (2) (3)1 1 1 1 1, , , 0,0,5,5S S S S Sk k k k= =k  ---(95) 
 Sensor #2:  { } { }(0) (1) (2) (3)2 2 2 2 2, , , 0,3,4,3S S S S Sk k k k= =k  ---(96) 
 Evidence,  E = { 1
Sk  , 2
Sk  , r} = { 1
Sk  , 2
Sk , 10} ---(97) 















1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0





































































   
 ---(98) 












Equations (98) and (99) together form the total criteria for the evidence based on the system 
logic. Both equations (98) and (99) must be met for the combination of sensor information 
vectors, 1 2 10{ , ,..., ,..., }
S S S S
lv v v v  to be valid. 
Partial criteria deal with subsets of the combination of sensor information vectors, 
1 2{ , ,..., }
S S S
lv v v where l < 10. The fact that Slv  is a non negative integer can be exploited to 
establish partial criteria. Let {min1 , min2 , … , minl , … , min10} and {max1 , max2 , … , maxl 
, … , max10} bet the set of minimum and maximum values respectively for all Slv . This allows 
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+ ≤ =∑ ∑   and  
10
' '








+ ≥ =∑ ∑           ---(102)(103) 
The next step is to identify common sensor information vector numbers, Slv . From equation 
(83), it can be observed that 1 2 3 4,  ,  ,  
S S S Sv v v v  and 5




elements exist on rows 1, 2 and 5 which have zero observations in the evidence vector, E . From 
equation (84), it can be observed that (3)10 2 3
S Sv k= =  since the only non-zero element of the 8th 
row of matrix M corresponds to 10
Sv , and the 8th row of the evidence vector, E , is (3)2
Sk . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10    
0 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
00 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
   ...  50 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
01 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
























1 0 1 0 5
0 1 0 1 2
' ' '
1 1 0 0 3










            • = → • =             
M v E  ---(104) 
 where 1 2 3 4 5 0
S S S S Sv v v v v= = = = = , 10 3
Sv =  and r' = 7. 
The sets {min6 , min7 , min8 , min9} and {max6 , max7 , max8 , max9} are trivially set at: 




 {max6 , max7 , max8 , max9} = {r' , r' , r' , r'} ---(106) 
The minimum and maximum sets can be improved based on the matrix M and evidence set E 
through iteratively undertaking (93) and (94) until the sets in (105) and (106) reach steady state. 
Accordingly, the minima and maxima are as follows: 
 {min6 , min7 , min8 , min9} = {1 , 0 , 2 , 0} ---(107) 
 {max6 , max7 , max8 , max9} = {3 , 2 , 4 , 2} ---(108) 
The generation of combinations is then carried out using the partial criteria represented in 
equations (100), (101), (102) and (103), and total criteria represented in equations (99) and 
(104). The process is illustrated in Figure 33. It can be seen that there are three sensor 
information vector combinations that imply the evidence. The method illustrated in Figure 31 and 
Figure 32 has reduced the problem to that of one considering 9 different combinations of 4 
sensor information vectors as opposed to the completely trivial method of individual 
consideration of a possible 3 724 680 960 combinations of 10 sensor information vectors, 





Figure 33: Generation of sensor information vector combinations.4 
5.5. DOWNWARDS INFERENCE - CUT SET GENERATION ALGORITHM 
To evaluate the likelihood function, the probabilities of the sensor information vector 
combinations that have been have been generated by the Combination Generation Algorithm 
outlined above need to be calculated. The probability of each component state probability cut set 
(where each cut set is in effect a specific instance of a component state vector) is easily 
evaluated. Each sensor state combination will have a corresponding set of component cut sets, 
x = {x1 , x2 , … , xb , … , xn'}, and can be substituted into equation (70) to yield the sensor 
information vector probability. 
                                                 
4 The author has observed that in all the instances he has run this algorithm, the corresponding illustration to figure 5 
always generates a symmetric path through feasible combination elements. 
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The Cut Set Generation Algorithm process is similar to the Combination Generation Algorithm 
in that it rapidly eliminates large numbers of component cut sets for consideration by rapidly 
identifying and discarding those that are irrelevant. There are a total of zn' possible sets (or 
component state vectors) with only a small fraction of them relevant cut sets. From the 
Combination Generation Algorithm a set of ‘relevant’ sensor information vectors will be 
identified as all sensor information vectors from which all combinations of sensor information 
vectors consist of. 
i.e. { }S Sl= ∀x x  for  l∀ where 0 for each     Slv combination of sensor state vectors≠  ---(109) 
5.5.1. Step 1: Generation of Constraints.  
The set of requirements that each cut set must satisfy is subsequently referred to as constraints. 
The two types of constraints introduced earlier still apply: 
a. Partial (optional, but will greatly speed computation). Partial constraints are those that 
apply to cut sub-sets {x1 , x2 , … , xb }, b < n'. In this instance, a partial constraint implies 
that a particular cut sub-set belongs to at least one complete cut set that implies one of the 
sensor information vectors considered in the Combination Generation Algorithm. 
b. Total. Total constraints are those that apply to complete cut sets  




constraint implies that a particular complete cut set implies one of the sensor information 
vectors considered in the Combination Generation Algorithm. 
5.5.2. Step 2: Setting minimum and maximum component state variables, xj.  
One of two possible approaches must be used to establish minimum and maximum xj values: 
a. Trivial. All component state variables. xb, are assigned values of 0 and (z-1) as minimum 
and maximum values respectively. 
{min1 , min2 , … , minb , … , minn'} = {0 , 0 , … , 0 , … 0} ---(110) 
{max1 , max2 , … , maxb , … , maxn'} = {(z-1) , (z-1) , … , (z-1) , … , (z-1)} ---(111) 
b. Theoretical (optional, but will greatly speed computation). All component state variables. 
xb, have minimum and maximum values derived from constraints. The number of 
subsequent possible cut sets is significantly reduced, thereby reducing computational 
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5.5.3. Step 3: Generation of cut sets - ‘Sideways consideration / Upwards generation’.  
As previously discussed, the final process is using the remaining undefined values of xj and their 
associated minimum and maximum values to generate a set of all cut sets that meet the 
constraints. This is done sequentially in sub-sets {x1 , x2 , … , xb}, for b = 1,2, … , n'  (i.e. 
sideways consideration) for each possible remaining combination (i.e. upwards generation). 
Acceptance and rejection occurs as follows: 
a. Cut Sub-sets {x1 , x2 , … , xb}, b < n'. Cut sub-sets are tested against partial criteria. Cut 
sub-sets that meet partial criteria indicate potential for the remaining undefined values of 
{xb+1 , xb+2 , … , xn'} to imply the evidence. If any one partial criterion is not met, then all 
combinations that contain that particular sub-set are invalid. This significantly reduces the 
number of possible cut sets that subsequently need to be considered, reducing 
computational time. 
b. Complete Cut Sets {x1 , x2 , … , xb , … , xn'}. Complete cut sets are tested against total 
criteria. Complete cut sets that meet total criteria imply the observed evidence and are 
added to the set of cut sets that imply the evidence. 





Figure 34: Overlapping Cut Set Generation Algorithm  
(‘sideways consideration / upwards generation’) 
Example 15: Cut-set (state vector) generation for sensor information vectors 
Consider the two component series system in Example 14. The Combination Generation 
Algorithm generated three possible combinations of sensor information vectors that implied the 
evidence, and are listed in equations (114), (115), and (116). 
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 { }1 6 7 8 101, 2, 4, 3S S S S Sv v v v= = = = =v  ---(114) 
 { }2 6 7 8 9 102, 1, 3, 1, 3S S S S S Sv v v v v= = = = = =v  ---(115) 
 { }3 6 8 9 103, 2, 2, 3S S S S Sv v v v= = = = =v  ---(116) 
where Slv  is the number of times the l
th sensor information vector, Slx , appears in the 
combination, and all values Slv  that are not listed in (114), (115) or (116) are zero. 
The relevant sensor information are those referenced in (114), (115) and (116) that form the set: 
 { }6 7 8 9 10, , , ,S S S S S S=x x x x x x      ---(117) 
These relevant sensor information vectors are listed in Table 10. 
xS 




Sx  2 1 
7 7
Sx  3 1 
8 8
Sx  2 2 
9 9
Sx  3 2 
10 10
Sx  3 3 
Table 10: List of relevant sensor information vectors for the system in Figure 30 with evidence 
in equations (95), (96) and (97). 




the state vector and system logic (such as that illustrated in Figure 29).  
( ) { }( )1 2 3 ', , ,..., ,...,S S Si i i b nx x x x x xφ φ= =x  
1 if the (sub-) system has completely failed    
                                    ...
1 if the (sub-) system is in the first degraded state
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        = = =     








The total criteria for component state vectors, x  = {x1 , x2 , x3 , … , xb , … , xn'}, is that they 
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x x x x xx
x x x x x x
φφ
φ φ
        = = = ∈     









The partial criteria deal with component state vector sub-sets, {x1 , x2 , x3 , … , xb} where b < n'. 
If {min1 , min2 , … , minb , … , minn'} and {max1 , max2 , … , maxb , … , maxn'} are the set of 
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         = = =     

















  ≥ = ∈ 
  
xx x   ---(121) 
The sets {min1 , min2} and {max1 , max2} are trivially set at: 
 {min1 , min2} = {0 , 0} ---(122) 
 {max1 , max2} = {(z – 1) , (z – 1)} = {3 , 3} ---(123) 
The minimum and maximum sets are improved based on iteratively undertaking (112) and (113) 
until the sets in (122) and (123) reach steady state shown in (124) and (125). 
 {min1 , min2} = {1 , 0} ---(124) 




The generation of cut-sets is then carried out using the partial criteria represented in equations 
(120) and (121) and total criterion represented in equation (119). The process is illustrated in 
Figure 35.  
 
Figure 35: Generation of component cut-sets. 
It can be seen that there are ten cut-sets that generate sensor information vectors that form 
combinations previously identified. The algorithm reduces the number of potential cut-sets that 
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high proportion of relevant cut-sets (10 out of 16), but this process will yield significant 
computational reductions in larger, more complex systems. 
5.6. EVALUATING DOWNWARDS INFERENCE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION 
Recall that the likelihood function for downwards inference was modified to: 
( )




























The outputs of the combination generation and cut-set generation algorithms allow equation (70) 
to be solved. 
Example 16: Multi-state on-demand system likelihood function evaluation 
Consider the two component series system in Example 14. The three possible combinations of 
sensor information vectors are: 
 { }1 6 7 8 101, 2, 4, 3S S S S Sv v v v= = = = =v  ---(114) 
 { }2 6 7 8 9 102, 1, 3, 1, 3S S S S S Sv v v v v= = = = = =v  ---(115) 
 { }3 6 8 9 103, 2, 2, 3S S S S Sv v v v= = = = =v  ---(116) 
where Slv  is the number of times the l




combination, and all values Slv  that are not listed in (114), (115) or (116) are zero. 
The relevant sensor information vectors form the set: 
 { }6 7 8 9 10, , , ,S S S S S S=x x x x x x      ---(117) 
The vectors in (117), their cut-sets and conditional probabilities are listed in Table 11. 
Sensor information 
vector Cut Sets 
x  = {x1 , x2} ( )Pr |
S
l px  
l Slx  
6 {2,1} {1,2} ( ) (1) (2)6 1 2Pr S p p=x  
7 {3,1} {1,3} ( ) (1) (3)7 1 2Pr S p p=x  
8 {2,2} {2,0}; {2,1}; {2,2} ( ) (2) (0) (2) (1) (2) (2)8 1 2 1 2 1 2Pr S p p p p p p= + +x  
9 {3,2} {2,3} ( ) (2) (3)9 1 2Pr S p p=x  
10 {3,3} {3,0}; {3,1}; {3,2}; {3,3} ( )
(3) (0) (3) (1) (3) (2) (3) (3)
10 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2Pr
S p p p p p p p p= + + +x  
Table 11: List of relevant sensor information vectors for the system in Figure 30 with evidence 
in equations (95), (96) and (97) and mutually exclusive cut-sets. 
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(1) 3 (2) 4 (3) 3 (2) (3) 2
1 1 1 2 2
(0) (2) (2) 2 (0) (1) (2) (3) 3
2 1 2 2 2 2 2
(0) (2) (2) 2 (2) 2
2 1 2 2
(3) (0) (2) (2)
2 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )1
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 
 
× + + + + + 
=  
 + + + ×  + + +     
---(126) 
5.7. SUMMARY 
Chapter 5 outlined an algorithm that is used to generate likelihood functions that allow Bayesian 
analysis of overlapping data sets from on-demand systems. At the heart of the algorithm is the 
development of sets of combinations of sensor information vectors that imply the evidence. A 
sensor information vector summarises the states detected by all sensors in a particular demand. 
Based on the number of demands, generating combinations of sensor information vectors that 
imply the evidence is the most computationally burdensome activity. By replacing component 




combination can include is considerably less (noting that there will be fewer sensors than 
components). The probability of each sensor information vector can be calculated using cut sets 







Chapter 6: Overlapping data likelihood function of systems with 
continuous life metrics 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the case of systems based on time (which is a continuous life metric), the probability of the jth 
component having failed at a given time t is defined by the set of reliability parameters of that 
component. This requires a fundamental change in approach to data analysis when compared to  
that for on-demand. This chapter outlines a methodology that allows Bayesian analysis of time-
based systems that have overlapping data sets. The methodology is completely translatable to 
systems based on other continuous life metrics (such as distance). 
6.2. TIME BASED FAILURE PROBABILITY 
For a system, component failure probability is equivalent to the time based cumulative 
distribution function or CDF, F(t). The failure probability then becomes a function of time. The 
CDF is defined by a set of parameters, which for the jth component is represented as jθ . The set 
of all n component parameters for the system is: 




As the CDF is the failure probability of each component at time t: 
 ( ) ( )j j j j j jtime tp t F t p p== = = θ θ  ---(128) 
The probability that the jth component will fail at time tj is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Pr
j j
j j j j j j j j j j
t t t t
d dT t f t dt dt p t dt F t
dt dt= =
   = = = =      
   θ θ θ θ  ---(129) 
where ( )j j jf t θ  is the probability density function or PDF of the time to failure of the jth 
component given the set of parameters jθ . 
It is typical for PDFs to be used in likelihood functions dealing with continuous random 
variables, even though they are not by definition probabilities. PDFs are non-zero and exploit 
proportionality, whilst specific probabilities of a continuous random variable being a particular 
value are zero. Notwithstanding, expressing the probability of observing a continuous random 
variable as a factor of dt (even though this is as discussed theoretically equivalent to zero) is 
important for subsequent steps in the methodology proposed.  
Recall that if overlapping data sets are denoted E• (each E• is overlapping with every other E•), 
then  overlapping data within a system based on continuous life metrics is formally written in 
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where 1 2 3{ , , ,...}E E E
• • •  is a number of overlapping data/evidence sub-sets of the total 
evidence E. 
As overlapping data sets are dependent, the overall likelihood function is not a product of 
individual data set likelihood functions. 
 { }( ) ( )1 2 3, , ,... | |i
i
L E E E E L E• • • •
∀
= ≠ ∏θ θ  ---(131) 
The inherent dependence of overlapping data means that each set is dependent on some or all of 
the other sets, and the likelihood function in equation (131) can be amended: 
 { }( ) ( )1 2 3, , ,... | | ,i i
i
L E E E E L E E• • • • •≠
∀
= = ⊆ ∀∏θ θ  ---(132) 
As studied previously, it is often the case where sensors are placed at various hierarchical levels 





 1 2 3{ , , ,..., ,..., }
S S S S S S
i mE t t t t t= =t  ---(133) 
where E is the evidence set of the complex system, m is the number of sensors in the 
system, and Sit  is the time failure is detected by the ith sensor. 
To better understand the nature of overlapping data sets in the context of time-based systems, the 
concept of inference diagrams is introduced. Each sub-set is defined by an inference diagram. In 
effect, inference diagrams modify the likelihood function in equation (132) by generating 
separate likelihood functions for each sub-set of the evidence, and generating an overall 
likelihood function through their product.  
Example 17: Inference Diagrams 
Consider the 4 component, 3 sensor system in Figure 36. The different colours denote different 
regions of inference and influence for each sensor. Components 2 and 3 are identical components 
(i.e. components from the same component type). The component type number of the jth 
component, jb, is listed in Table 12. 
Component Number 
b = ∈ (1, 2, … , n') 
Component Type 




1 1 (type A) p1 
2 2 (type B) p2 
3 2 (type B) p2 
4 3 (type C) p3 
Table 12: Component numbers and component type numbers for components  





Figure 36: Three sensor on-demand system with paths of apparent influence indicated 
It can be seen that there are three distinct apparent inference paths. The blue inference path 
terminates at the top event or system level, and shows that components 1, 2 and sensor #3 data 
does not have an apparent influence on system level characteristics since sensor #2 summarizes 
all subordinate structural characteristics. Should sensor #3 evidence change or be re-evaluated, it 
will have no implication on system level evidence if the sensor #2 evidence remains unchanged. 
In this way, sensors can ‘isolate’ the inference and influence of subordinate systems, sub-systems 
and components. The inference of each sensor separate the system in figure 16 into three separate 
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Figure 37: Three apparent sub-systems based on inference relationships 
  
The inference diagram introduced in Example 17 is a directed acyclic graph that illustrates paths 
of apparent inference and how sensor data summarizes the effect that subordinate components 
have on superior sensors. Inference diagrams are technically a form of an influence diagram 
primarily emanating from the fields of Bayesian networks and decision-making methodologies. 
Nevertheless, some distinction between the two is worthwhile as inference diagrams only 
involve ‘events’ in the form of component functionality, and are meant to assign inference from 
components to sensors rather than being a fundamental part of calculation. They also include 
additional information on the nature of dependence between components by the inclusion of 
logical gates (such as the ‘AND’ / ‘OR’ gates of a fault-tree). The colour shading in Figure 36 
and Figure 37 emphasizes how the system is broken into sub-systems, while the grey shading 
highlights that components 2 and 3 both share failure probability p2.  [18] 
p2 p3 
  





















In this way, the apparent inference from superior sensor data comes from subordinate sensor data 
and subordinate components. For example, components 3 and 4 in Figure 36 and Figure 37 are 
subject to inference from sensors #1 and #2 only; how components 1 and 2 behave does not 
matter given data from sensor #2 is gathered (hence the term apparent inference). 
The system in Figure 36 is equally well represented by the three separate sub-systems in Figure 
37. By definition, they are overlapping through the dependency between failures detected by the 
same sensor represented in different sub-systems. However, the sub-systems can be treated as 
non-overlapping when each is calculated in the context of all other evidence sets (which would 
be the product of individual likelihood functions of each sub-system). As components 2 and 3 are 
identical but appear in different sub-systems, the likelihood of the component type failure 
probability is influenced by two of the three sub-system likelihood functions. 
As illustrated in Figure 38 (which replicates the system represented in Figure 36 and Figure 37), 
the inference from any sub-set of the evidence must be considered in the context provided by all 
other evidence. For example, sensor #1 will always detect failure at the same time sensor #2 
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6.3. HIERARCHY OF SENSORS AND COMPONENTS 
If a system has m sensors, then the hierarchy of each sensor needs to be understood. The 
following definition and terminology is based on any reliability graphical representation of a 
system but is most easily observed within a fault-tree. Any component or sensor that is 
hierarchically beneath a particular point but not necessarily within the same branch in a graphical 
representation of a system is said to be at a lower-level to that point. Conversely, any component 
or sensor that is hierarchically above a particular point but not necessarily within the same 
branch is said to be at a higher-level to that point. Any component or sensor that is at the same 
level hierarchically is said to be equivalent. 
Any lower-level component or sensor that appears within the same branch of a particular point is 
said to be subordinate. Likewise, any higher-level component or sensor that appears within the 
same branch of a particular point is said to be superior. For any sensor, all subordinate 
components and sensors that appear in its relevant inference diagram (as per the example in 
Figure 38) are said to be inferentially subordinate. 
Let the 1st sensor be such be the ‘highest’ sensor and the mth sensor be the ‘lowest’. This means 
that in any fault-tree representation, the (i+1)th sensor will always be represented below or 
hierarchically equivalent to the ith sensor. Inferentially subordinate sensors to the ith sensor must 





Figure 39: Hierarchy of a 5 component, 5 sensor system with respect to sensor #2 
Figure 38 also illustrates how data from subordinate sensors effectively summarizes the effect 
that lower level components have on higher level sensors. Therefore, the time to failure detection 
characteristics of each sensor is conditional on inferentially subordinate components and sensors 
only. Referring to Figure 39, even though component 1 is subordinate to sensor #2, it is not 
inferentially subordinate to sensor #2 as sensor #4 provides all relevant information about the 
state of the system at that point. Given that sensor #4 exists, the behaviour of component 1 is no 
longer relevant. This allows the generation of inferentially subordinate sets for each sensor as 
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1 {2,3} {S2,S3} 2 3{ , }
S St t  ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ 
2 {4} {S4} 4{ }
St  {2,3} {C2,C3} {p2,p3} { }2 3, θ θ  
3 {5} {S5} 5{ }
St  {4} {C4} {p4} { }4θ  
4 ∅ ∅ ∅ {1} {C1} {p1} { }1θ  
5 ∅ ∅ ∅ {5} {C5} {p5} { }5θ  
 
Table 13: Expression of multi-level evidence for binary-state on-demand systems 












t … the set of all failure detection times of sensors that are inferentially subordinate to 














p … the set of failure probabilities of all components that are inferentially subordinate 
to the ith sensor (i.e. the failure probabilities of all components ∈ Si
⊂C ); and 
S
i
⊂θ … the set of reliability parameters of all components that are inferentially subordinate 





As all of the sets above are drawn from internally from the system, the following can also be 
written: 
 Si
⊂ ⊆ p p  and Si
⊂ ⊆θ θ            ---(134)(135) 
Therefore, generalizing the likelihood function in equation (132) allows the posterior distribution 
using evidence taken as the times failure is detected by various sensors is: 
 
( ) { }( ) { }( )1 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 3| | , , ,..., ,..., | , , ,..., ,...,S S S S Si m i mE E E E E E t t t t t• • • • •= =θ θ θπ π π
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where E is the evidence set 1 2 3{ , , ,..., ,..., }
S S S S S
i mt t t t t  and 
S
it  is time failure is detected by the 
ith sensor. 
It can be seen that equation (136) is of similar construction to what one would expect when 
compiling multiple non-overlapping data sets (by simply multiplying individual likelihood 
functions). The key difference is that the likelihood function for each overlapping data element 
(which is the time to failure detection of the ith sensor) is conditional on all inferentially 
subordinate failure detection times. This allows the dependence from the overlapping nature of 




likelihood function in equation (136) utilizes a state of knowledge dependence to incorporate 
multiple instances of the same component type. This dependence assumes that each component 
has the same underlying reliability parameters.  
6.4. PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTIONS OF TIMES THAT SENSORS DETECT 
FAILURE 
The development of a likelihood function for a system using evidence of the form introduced in 
equation (133) requires the time to failure detection probabilities of all sensors to be calculated. 
This involves the PDF of time to failure being calculated for the relevant points in the system. 
Using the system illustrated in Figure 38, the relationship between tS (time sensor detects failure) 
and t (times that components fail) is illustrated in Figure 40. 








Figure 40: Representation of the probabilistic relationship between component failure times and 
times to detection of failure by sensors. 
 
Figure 41: Representation of the probabilistic relationship between component failure times and 



































The CDF of the time to failure detection by the ith sensor is based on the CDF of time to failure 
(detection) of inferentially subordinate components and sensors. The PDF is the derivative of the 
CDF with respect to t. 
i.e. probability of ith sensor failure detection  ( ) ( )'| , ,S S S S S Si i i i i i jt tF t p p p p
⊂ ⊂ = = ∀ ∀θ t ---(137) 
 where ' Sii
⊂∈ i  and Sij
⊂∈ j . 
All probabilities in equation (137) are functions of time and conditional on inferentially 
subordinate parameters, and equivalent to respective CDFs (i.e. CDF ≡ p). The CDF of the time 
to failure detection is a function based on system logic (through generation of disjoint cut-sets or 
equivalent method). The PDF of time to sensor detection by the ith sensor is the derivative of 
equation (137) with respect to time. 





S S S S
jS S S S Si i i i
i i i i i j S
i j ji
dpdp d p dp pf t p p p
dt dt dt p dtp⊂ ⊂
⊂ ⊂
∈ ∈
  ∂ ∂
= = ∀ ∀ = • + •     ∂∂   
∑ ∑
i j
θ t ---(138) 
 where ' Sii
⊂∈ i  and Sij
⊂∈ j . 
When sensor evidence or data is introduced, the probabilistic relationships in Figure 40: and 
Figure 41 are broken between separate inference diagrams as previously discussed. This is 






Figure 42: Representation of the probabilistic relationship between component failure times and 
times at which sensors detect failure – sensor inference sub-systems (where the times to failure 
detection of sensors #2 and #3 are known). 
The evidence defines the characteristics of all inferentially subordinate sensors, which are those 
that appear on the right hand side of equations (137) and (138). The CDF of the time to failure 
detection of inferentially subordinate sensors becomes the unit or Heaviside step function5. This 
modifies equation (137) to: 
 ( ) ( )'| , ,S S S S S Si i i i i i jF t p p p p⊂ ⊂ = = ∀ ∀θ t  ---(139) 
 where ( )' 'S Si ip H t t= −  and H(x) is the unit or Heaviside step function. 
                                                 
5 In this dissertation, the right continuous Heaviside step function will be used where H(x) = 1 when x ≥ 0, 0 
otherwise. 
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This allows the modification of the CDF of to time to failure detection by superior sensors, and 
introduces ‘steps’. For example, the CDFs for sensors #1 and #2 in Figure 42 are illustrated in 
Figure 43. It can be seen how the failure detection by subordinate sensors introduces ‘steps’ into 
the CDF of the superior sensor time to failure detection. As the conditional PDF in equation 
(140) is in effect the derivative of these stepped functions, special care must be taken when 
dealing with them mathematically. The PDFs of the CDFs below are undefined at the times 
when subordinate sensors detect failure, and hence cannot be substituted directly into Bayes’ 
Theorem. In this context, the probability of observing a particular instance of a continuous 
random variable (which is typically zero), will actually be finite when it coincides with the 
failure detection times of subordinate sensors. 
 
Figure 43: Conditional CDFs of time to failure detection of sensors #2 and #1 respectively, 






























Throughout this dissertation, the following taxonomy will be adhered to: 
a. ( ) ,  and  ,
S
S S S i
i i i





 apply to the sensor being analysed. These functions 
are conditional on inferentially subordinate sensors and components. The functions are 
directly utilized in the development of the likelihood function, as they calculate 
probabilities associated with the time the ith sensor detects failure. 
b. Evidential probability of failure detection ( )'Sip  applies to inferentially subordinate 
sensors. This function is primarily conditional on observed times to failure, as they 
contextualize the functions in the previous sub-paragraph. 
As equation (140) is the PDF of time to failure detection by the ith sensor at time t, it is 
equivalent to the likelihood function: 
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The Dirac delta function is defined as 0 when x ≠ 0 and + ∞ when x = 0 (and hence is not a 
proper function), making the evaluation of equation (141) problematic. Appendix A outlines how 
a likelihood function of the form in equation (141) is dealt with in a Bayesian context. Therefore, 
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 given { }'i i= ∀i  such that '
S S
i it t=  and '
S
ii
⊂∈ i . 
Equation (142) will be a function of inferentially subordinate sensor failure detection 
probabilities. Recall that in each case, this is defined as: 







i i i S
i
t t
p t t H t t
t t
 <= − = 
≥   
---(143) 
The likelihood of observing the set of failure detection times of the m sensors,  
1 2 3{ , , ,..., ,..., }
S S S S S S
i mt t t t t=t  given the set of parameters that define the reliability (and failure 
probability) characteristics of all system components 1 2 3{ , , ,..., ,..., }j n=θ     θ θ θ θ θ , is defined 
below. The likelihood functions derived from the data set of each sensor can now be multiplied 
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given { }'i i= ∀i   such that '
S S
i it t=  and '
S
ii
⊂∈ i  and where ( )' 'S Si itp H t t= − , 







= θ . 
6.5. CENSORED DATA 
Thus far, overlapping data sets have been considered where all sensors, systems and sub-systems 
are allowed to operate until failure is detected. The evidence set, 1 2 3{ , , ,..., ,..., }
S S S S S S
i mt t t t t=t , 
contains specific times or inequalities for all Sit , which is the time that the i
th sensor detects 
failure. It is not unusual for systems to cease being operated (or observed) once sensor level 


















If the ith sensor has not detected failure by time it
∗ , (i.e. { }Si it t t
∗= ∀ > ), then the likelihood of the 
corresponding observation is simply the complement of probability of failure detection by the ith 





i.e. ( )| , 1
i
S S S S S
i i i i i t t
L t p ∗
⊂ ⊂
=
= −θt  if { }Si it t t
∗= ∀ >  ---(146) 
All inferentially subordinate sensors (recalling that they are primarily conditional on observed 
failure detection time) need to be modified to incorporate right censored data. As inferentially 
subordinate sensor probability functions contextualize the likelihood functions of higher-level 
sensor data, a provision must be made for scenarios where inferentially subordinate sensors 
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In effect, equation (147) allows scenarios where subordinate sensors are right censored, meaning 
that the only thing that is known about their respective sub-system is that eventual time to failure 
will occur sometime after 'it
∗ . Therefore, the ‘state of knowledge’ of the eventual time to failure 
becomes a truncated PDF defined on 'it t
∗> . 
This modifies the likelihood function derived in equation (144), which is based exclusively on an 
evidence set where the system is allowed to operate until all sensors detect failure, to the 
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given { }'i i= ∀i  such that '
S S
i it t=  and '
S
ii
⊂∈ i , where  Sip  is the probability of the i
th 
sensor detecting failure expressed as a function of time t, inferentially subordinate 
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 , ( )|j j jtp F t= θ  and 





= θ . 
6.6. CONTINUOUS LIFE METRIC SYSTEM - ALGORITHM 
The practical construction of the likelihood function, equation (144), is based on the distinct 
steps listed below. It is assumed that the logic of the system in question has been determined 





6.6.1. Step 1: Determine the set of all inferentially subordinate components and sensors 
for each sensor.  










j  … the set of indices of all components that are inferentially subordinate to the ith sensor. 
For example, if a system fails whenever a sub-system with its own sensor (sensor #2) or a 
separate component (component 1) fails, then the relevant sets for sensor #1 (the system) are 
{2}Si
⊂ =i  and {1}Si
⊂ =j . 
6.6.2. Step 2: Model system failure detection probabilities on inferentially subordinate 
components and sensors.  
This involves generating expressions for each sensor, as per equation (139). The function, by 
definition, must be expressed in terms of the inferentially subordinate sensors and components 
established in the previous step. 
( ) ( )'| , ,S S S S S Si i i i i i jF t p p p p⊂ ⊂ = = ∀ ∀θ t
 
---(139) 
The structure of these functions is based on system logic and derived utilizing Boolean algebra. 




separate component (component 1) fails, then the probability of failure detection for the 1st 
sensor (the system) is defined as ( )1 2' 1 2' 1S S Sp p p p p= + − . All inferentially subordinate sensors 
that appear on the right hand side of these equations are denoted '
S
ip  (and therefore 1'
Si ⊂∈ i ). 
6.6.3. Step 3: Compile evidence.  
The evidence set, 1 2 3{ , , ,..., ,..., }
S S S S S S
i mt t t t t=t , is the compilation of times until failure detection 
for each sensor, Sit . If the detection time is right censored (as in detection stopped at it
∗  with no 
failure), then Sit  is the set of all time greater than it
∗ : { }Si it t t
∗= ∀ > . 
6.6.4. Step 4: Compile evidential probability of failure detection '
S
ip  for all inferentially 
subordinate sensors.  
The expression for '
S
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  ---(147) 
6.6.5. Step 5: Differentiate all sensor failure detection probabilities, Sip , with respect to  
inferentially subordinate sensor failure detection probabilities, '
S
ip .   
For example, if a system fails whenever a sub-system with its own sensor (sensor #2) or a 
separate component (component 1) fails, then the derivative of 1
Sp  with respect to 2'




6.6.6. Step 6: Differentiate all sensor failure detection probabilities, Sip , with respect to 
inferentially subordinate component failure probabilities, pj.  
For example, if a system fails whenever a sub-system with its own sensor (sensor #2) or a 
separate component (component 1) fails, then the derivative of 1
Sp  with respect to p1 is 2'1
Sp− . 
6.6.7. Step 7: For all sensors, compile set of all inferentially subordinate sensors that have 
identical failure detection times.  
That is, { }'i i= ∀i  such that '
S S
i it t=  and '
S
ii
⊂∈ i . It is possible that no inferentially subordinate 
sensors share the same time to failure detection to the ith sensor, in which case ii  will be a null 
set, ∅. 
6.6.8. Step 8: Substitute all elements into the likelihood function.  
At this stage, all elements of equation  (148)  have been determined, and substitution will yield 
the likelihood function. 
Example 18: Basic two component continuous life metric system overlapping data analysis 
Consider the simple parallel system illustrated in Figure 44 The system is tested until failure is 
detected by each sensor. Sensor #2 detects failure first, followed by the system (sensor #1). Both 





Figure 44: Basic two component parallel system 
Component number: j PDF: ( )|j jf t θ  CDF: ( )|j jF t θ  Parameters: jθ  
1 11
λ tλ e−  11 λ te−−  λ1 
2 22
λ tλ e−  21 λ te−−  λ2 
Table 14: Component reliability characteristics for system illustrated in Figure 44. 
 
Step 1. The sets of inferentially subordinate sensors and components for each sensor are shown 
in Table 15: 





1 {2} {2} 
2 ∅ {1} 
Table 15: Sets of inferentially subordinate sensors and components for the system in Figure 44.  
Step 2. The sensor failure detection probabilities in terms of inferentially subordinate 
components and sensors are listed in equations (149) and (150). 
System (Sensor #1) System (Sensor #1) 
1 
Sensor  #2 
2 
● Number of components, n = 2  




 For sensor #1: 1 2' 2
S Sp p p= ×  ---(149) 
 For sensor #2: 2 1
Sp p=  ---(150) 
Step 3. The times to failure detection generate the evidence set: 
 { }1 210.538 , 9.269 S S SE t h t h= = = =t  ---(151) 
Step 4. There is only one inferentially subordinate sensor (sensor #2), and its evidential failure 
probability is: 
 ( )2'  9.269
S
t
p H t= −  ---(152) 













Sp  p2 n/a 
p1 n/a 1 
p2 2'
Sp  n/a 
Table 16: Partial derivatives of higher level failure probabilities for the missile guidance system 
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It can be observed that the likelihood function in equation (153) is equivalent to: 
 ( ) 1
2
component 1 failing at 9.269 h given ; and
| Pr








t  ---(154) 
as there are no instances of right 
censoring, and no instances of identical 






The likelihood function is illustrated in Figure 45.  
 
Figure 45: Likelihood function for system illustrated in Figure 44 with evidence set (151) 
The downwards inference technique outlined above is able to incorporate overlapping data from 
various levels from within a system and can identify situations where sensor data is able to infer 
information directly about individual component failure times (a situation explored in Example 
18). Downwards inference also infers information when the sequence of sensor failure detection 
effectively ‘masks’ some of the component failure times (a situation explored in Example 19).  
Example 19: Basic two component continuous life metric system overlapping data analysis 
Consider the same simple parallel system considered in Example 18 and illustrated in Figure 44. 
The system is tested until failure is detected by each sensor. As opposed to Example 18, the 
system (sensor #1) and sensor #2 detect failures simultaneously. The failure detection times, in 



















 { }1 2 9.745 S S SE t t h= = = =t  ---(155) 
Steps 1, 2, 5 and 6 in developing the likelihood function are identical to those in Example 18. 
Modified steps are listed below. 
Step 3: The times to failure detection generate the evidence set are { }1 2 9.745 S S SE t t h= = = =t . 
Step 4. There is only one inferentially subordinate sensor (sensor #2), and its evidential failure 
probability is: 
 ( )2'  9.745
S
t
p H t= −  ---(156) 
Step 7. Since  1 2
S St t= :    1 {2}=i  ---(157) 
But 2 = ∅i  as sensor #2 has no inferentially subordinate sensors ---(158) 
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p p f t
pp
= =
  ∂ ∂  = •
∂  ∂  
θ ( ) ( )( )
12 1 2 1
1 |S St tp f t== •
θ  
  ( ) ( )2 1 2 1 2 1| |S SF t f t=  θ θ ( )2 1 1 211 S St te eλ λλ− −= −  
 
( )2 19.745 9.74511 e eλ λλ− −= −  ---(159) 
It can be observed that the likelihood function in equation (159) is equivalent to: 
 ( ) 1
2
component 1 failing at 9.745 h given ; and
| Pr







θt  ---(160) 





Figure 46: Likelihood function for system illustrated in Figure 44 with evidence set (155) 
Example 20: Basic two component continuous life metric system overlapping data analysis 
Consider the simplified missile guidance system illustrated in Figure 47. It is being tested on 
inert missiles that have three additional sensors embedded that relay information back to a 
ground station real-time. The six components have had their time to failure probability modelled, 
and prior information exists for some of their reliability parameters from previous testing 
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λ tλ e−  41 λ te−−  λ4 ( ) ( )0 4 0.01,0.03π λ U=  
5 55
λ tλ e−  51 λ te−−  λ5 ( ) ( )0 5 0,0.02π λ U=  
6 66
λ tλ e−  61 λ te−−  λ6 ( ) ( )0 6 0,0.1π λ U=  
 
Table 17: Missile Guidance System component reliability characteristics for time expressed as 































Number of components, n = 6 
 




The entire set of parameters is defined as:  { }1 2 2 3 3 4 5 6, , , , , , ,λ β η μ σ λ λ λ=θ  ---(161) 
Step 1. The set of inferentially subordinate sensors and components for each sensor is shown in 
Table 18. 





1 {2,3} {4,6} 
2 ∅ {1,2,3} 
3 ∅ {5} 
Table 18: Sets of inferentially subordinate sensors and components for the system in Figure 47 
Step 2. The sensor failure detection probabilities in terms of inferentially subordinate 
components and sensors are: 
 For sensor #1: 1 2' 4 3' 6 2' 4 3' 2' 6 4 3' 6 2' 4 3' 6
S S S S S S S S Sp p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p= + + − − − +  ---(162) 
 For sensor #2: ( )2 1 2 3 2 3Sp p p p p p= + −  ---(163) 
 For sensor #3: 2 5
Sp p=  ---(164) 
Step 3. The missile guidance system was tested until it failed at 113.54 minutes. Before failure, 
sensor #3 detected failure at 78.69 minutes. After the system failed, the inert missile lost control 
causing the test to be declared complete at the time of system failure, with sensor #2 yet to detect 
failure: 




Step 4. The evidential failure probabilities of the inferentially subordinate sensors (sensor #2 and 






2' 2 2' 2'
2 113.54
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t  ---(166) 
noting that as the test concludes at 113.54 minutes, there is no need to develop 
equation (166) further. 
 ( )3'  78.69S tp H t= −  ---(167) 



















Sp  4 3' 6 4 3' 61
S Sp p p p p p+ − +  n/a n/a 
3'
Sp  4 2' 4 4 6 2' 4 6
S Sp p p p p p p p− − +  n/a n/a 
p1 n/a 2 3 2 3p p p p+ −  n/a 
p2 n/a ( )1 31p p−  n/a 
p3 n/a ( )1 21p p−  n/a 
p4 3' 2' 3' 3' 6 2' 3' 6
S S S S S Sp p p p p p p p− − +  n/a n/a 
p5 n/a n/a 1 
p6 2' 4 3' 2' 4 3'1
S S S Sp p p p p p− − +  n/a n/a 




Step 7. There are no instances of identical times to failure detection, so i i = ∅ for all i. 




1 ' '' '
1 ... if { } (i.e.   data)
















j j t t













− = ∀ > 
 
 ∂ ∂




















































  ∂  •
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3' 2' 3' 3' 6 2' 3' 6 4 4113.54
2' 4 3' 2' 4 3' 6 6113.54
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6 4 4113.54
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Breaking down equation (169) illustrates the nature of the system failure. In essence, the 





components 6 functional and 4 failing at 113.54 given { , }; or
;  and
   components 4 functional and 6 failing at 113.54 given { , }
| Pr









2 2 3 3
5
, , , , };  and







β η µ σ
λ
 
Substitution into Bayes’ Theorem yields: 
































where ( )|SL θt  is provided by equation (169) and ( )0 θπ  is given by the product of all 
prior distributions defined in Table 17. 
A set of random draws utilizing Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation is an effective way of 
understanding the nature of the joint posterior distributions of the reliability parameters. [20] The 








5th 50th 95th 5th 50th 95th 
λ1 n/a – improper prior distribution 0.0396 3.0383 17.375 
β2 2.05 2.50 2.95 2.0757 2.5019 2.9270 
η2 102.5 125.0 147.5 104.98 128.72 147.22 
µ3 n/a – improper prior distribution 12.511 137.49 240.25 
σ3 n/a – improper prior distribution 45.464 135.02 210.13 
λ4 0.011 0.020 0.029 0.0108 0.0168 0.0272 
λ5 0.001 0.010 0.019 0.0027 0.0110 0.0185 
λ6 0.005 0.050 0.095 0.0018 0.0132 0.0446 
 
Table 20: Missile Guidance System reliability parameter statistics (derived from Markov chain 
Monte Carlo simulation with 100 000 draws). 
6.7. SUMMARY 
Fully Bayesian methodologies have been developed for overlapping data at various levels within 
on-demand systems. The basis of this methodology is referred to as downwards inference and is 
extended to systems based on continuous life metrics in this chapter. A key aspect of downwards 
inference is the ability to incorporate overlapping data. Constraining overlapping data as non-
overlapping ignores the dependencies between the data sets and effectively removes information. 
An overlapping data likelihood function was developed to incorporate these inherent 
dependencies and generate the correct inference within Bayes’ Theorem for systems. All 
examples and equations were time based, but can easily transferrable to any other continuous 
independent random variable such as distance. The methodology developed above allow all 
information gathered from various hierarchical levels within a system to be correctly analysed to 
infer  all facets of information that such overlapping data sets contain. Several examples were 




how it can be used to correctly improve our state of knowledge (which is the set of component 
reliability characteristics parameters). The flexibility of the likelihood function allows 
incorporation of multiple instances of the same component simultaneously. Through state of 
knowledge dependence, the resultant overlapping data Bayesian method completely incorporates 











Chapter 7: Uncertain Evidence 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores fully Bayesian methodologies for incorporating uncertain overlapping data 
based on the likelihood functions outlined in previous chapters. In the case of on-demand 
systems, uncertain data manifests itself in terms of the number of observed degraded states from 
a number of demands, whereas it is manifested in terms of the time at which failure is detected 
for continuous time based systems. Incorporating uncertain evidence in the latter yields a 
likelihood function that is not only computationally simpler than that proposed in chapter 6, but 
correctly replicates reality in that all time detection devices have a known uncertainty.  
7.2. GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNCERTAIN DATA 
Uncertain data in a Bayesian context conventionally refers to error associated with data 
collection. A system will behave in a particular way, and uncertainty is drawn from any process 
that prevents this particular way to be properly understood. The observed (uncertain) evidence, 
Ê , is separate to the ‘true’ (unknown) evidence, E. When the observed evidence, Ê , is gathered 
using a process or device that has an inherent deviation from the actual evidence, E, the 
relationship between the two (or uncertainty) is probabilistic. Bayesian analysis necessarily 
requires this uncertainty to be characterized by a subjective probabilistic relationship.  
There are two types of methods that exist when the uncertainty is expressed as a conditional 




when the evidence set Ê  is observed: ˆPr( | )E E . This probabilistic relationship is referred to as 
Berkson error [21-23].  The first method for dealing with evidence uncertainty is Jeffrey’s rule 
of probability kinematics [24], and revolves around the generation of a posterior distribution 
which itself is the weighted average or weighted sum of posterior distributions for all possible 
true evidence sets, E as shown in equation (171).  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1ˆ ˆ| | Pr |
E
E E E Eπ π
∀
= ∑θ θ  ---(171) 
Cheeseman’s rule [25] is based on theory where prior information and observed data is combined 
to construct a weighted likelihood function, and is shown in equation (172).  
 ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ| | Pr |
E
L E L E E E
∀
= ∑θ θ  ---(172)  
Tan and Xi [26] propose a method where Classical error is used to summarize the relationship 
between E and Ê . Classical error expresses the uncertainty as a conditional probability that Ê  is 
the observed evidence set when the true evidence set is E: ˆPr( | )E E . [21, 23, 27] The method, 
referred to as likelihood in terms of observation, is expressed in equation (173).  




As mentioned in previous chapters, the calculation of the likelihood function of on-demand 
systems using downwards inference is computationally intensive. Therefore, there will be a 
significant computational liability with treating uncertainty evidence through evaluations of 
equation (171), (172) or (173). 
7.3. EVIDENCE UNCERTAINTY FOR ON-DEMAND SYSTEMS.  
With the nomenclature outlined above for both observed and true evidence sets, the likelihood 
function for overlapping data sets from multi-state on-demand systems in equation (64) can be 
re-written as equation (174). 
( ) ( )
( )'
ˆ












v∀ ∈ = =
     ∝   






recalling that  when av  implies the data/evidence set Ê , it appears in the set vE.  
In essence the right hand side of the proportionality in equation (174) is simply a sum of the 
probability of occurrence for all possible combinations of state vectors that imply the observed 
evidence for r demands. The term av  refers to the a
th combination of component state vectors, 
which is equivalent to a possible true evidence set, Ea. Therefore, (174) is expressed in terms of 
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The likelihood function in (174) therefore adheres to the likelihood in terms of observation 
method expressed in (173). 
7.4. CONTINUOUS TIME BASED SYSTEMS 
Example 19 in chapter 6 highlights the general implication of multiple sensors detecting failure 
at identical times for complex systems: there is typically a component that has failed prior to that 
time allowing the failure of a single component to cause multiple simultaneous failure detection. 
In reality, it is impossible to conclude from sensor whether failure detection was simultaneous 
due to limits in accuracy. A tenet of probability theory is that it is impossible for two random 
events to occur at exactly the same time. The time of failure detections in Example 19 was 9.745 
h, which implies the actual time to failure detection at each sensor is greater than or equal to 
9.745 h but less than 9.746 h (assuming accuracy of 0.001 h in measurement).6 In this case, it is 
possible for component 2 to have failed after component 1 even if both sensors detect times to 
                                                 
6 It is typical with most timing devices that time measurements increase ‘at’ increments of the smallest unit of 




failure of 9.745 h (e.g. components 1 and 2 could have failed at approximately 9.7453 h and 
9.7457 h respectively). Time measurements are recorded in multiples of basic time intervals that 
represent accuracy.  
e.g. t̂  = i ● Δt,        i ∈ 1 , 2 , 3 , … ---(176)  
where t̂  represents an uncertain observation of the underlying random variable, t 
(applicable to all random variables written throughout this dissertation).  
What this implies is that the actual time of failure, t, exists within the following domain: 
 ˆ ˆt t t t< ≤ + ∆  ---(177) 
The interval Δt is often used to define the accuracy of the time measurement device (e.g. 
hundredths or thousandths of a second is a typical short time frame accuracy metric). Assuming 
that all time measurements from multiple sensors within a system share common accuracy 
intervals, the likelihood function can be amended to be expressed in terms of component and 
sub-system CDFs only (i.e. not PDFs and hence no differentiation is required).  The uncertain 
data likelihood function is simplified and written in equation (178).  
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where Δt is the time increment used in measuring time to failure detection, ˆSt  (as opposed 
to St ) represents the vector of failure detection times with an inherent uncertainty, ∆t, and 
ˆ S
i
⊂t  is the set of all uncertain failure detection times of sensors that are inferentially 
subordinate to the ith sensor (i.e. the failure detection times of all sensors ∈ Si
⊂S ). 
This modifies the steps (6.6.1 to 6.6.8) to the following steps.  
7.4.1. Step 1: Determine the set of all inferentially subordinate components and sensors 
for each sensor.  










j  … the set of indices of all components that are inferentially subordinate to the ith sensor. 
7.4.2. Step 2: Model system failure detection probabilities on inferentially subordinate 
components and sensors.  
All functions that describe system failure detection probabilities are expressed in terms of the 




 ( ) ( )'| , ,
S S S S S S
i i i i i i jF t p p p p
⊂ ⊂ = = ∀ ∀θ t
 
---(139) 
7.4.3. Step 3: Compile uncertain evidence.  
The evidence set (times at which failure is detected) with inherent uncertainty ∆t is now 
represented as 1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ{ , , ,..., ,..., }S S S S S Si mt t t t t=t . As before, if the detection time is right censored (as 
in detection stopped at ît
∗  with no failure), then ˆSit  is the set of all time greater than ît
∗ : 
{ }Si it t t
∗= ∀ > . 
7.4.4. Step 4: Compile evidential probability of failure detection '
S
ip  for all inferentially 
subordinate sensors.  
The expression for '
S




ˆ0 ... if 
 











7.4.5. Step 5: Substitute all elements into the likelihood function.  
At this stage, all elements of equation  (178)  have been determined, and substitution will yield 




Example 21: Overlapping data analysis of a continuous time-based system with inherent 
timing inaccuracies. 
Consider the same simple parallel system considered in Example 19 based on the same evidence 
set, but the accuracy of measurement is 0.001 hr. The first two steps remain unchanged, but recall 
that: 
 For sensor #1: 1 2' 2
S Sp p p= ×  ---(149) 
 For sensor #2: 2 1
Sp p=  ---(150) 
The CDFs of time to failure for each component (from Table 14) are: 
 Component #1: ( ) 11 1 1| 1 tp F t e λλ −= = −  ---(180) 
and  Component #2: ( ) 22 2 2| 1 tp F t e λλ −= = −  ---(181) 
Step 3. The times to failure detection generate the evidence set: 
 { }1 2ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 9.745 S S SE t t h= = = =t   ... where ∆t = 0.001 h ---(182)  
Step 4. There is only one inferentially subordinate sensor (sensor #2), and its evidential failure 








ˆ0 ... if 
 










Step 5: Substituting the above equations into equation (178) yields:  
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ˆ0 ... if 
1
ˆ 11 ... if 
ˆ 10 ... if 
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   ≤  × −     − ≥ + ∆      =      − −≤      − × −    ≥ + ∆      
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---(184)  




An observation is that the likelihood function is zero if 1 2ˆ ˆ
S St t< , as it is physically impossible for 
sensor #1 to detect failure prior to sensor #2 due to it being a series system. Substituting the 
evidence from (182) generates equation (185). 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )2 1 19.745 0.001 9.745 0.001ˆ | , 1 1SL t t e e eλ λ λ− + − −∆ = − −θ
 
 
( ) ( )2 1 19.746 9.745 0.00011 1e e eλ λ λ− − −= − −
 
---(185)  
The same technique was used for the data proposed in Example 18, with the same uncertainty in 
measurement. The likelihood functions are illustrated in Figure 48. It can be observed that they 
very closely match the ‘certain’ likelihood functions in Figure 45 and Figure 46, whilst being 
significantly easier to evaluate (without the need for differentiating). 
 
Figure 48: Likelihood functions of system illustrated in Figure 44 with evidence sets (151) and 





































It can be seen that the limiting case of the general likelihood function in equation (184) when Δt 
approaches zero is equivalent to the likelihood functions from Example 18 and Example 19.  
 ( ) ( )1 2 2 1
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Uncertain data for continuous time based systems can be analysed using Berkson or Classical 
error in either equations (171), (172) or (173). However, a specific case of uncertain data 
analysis has been explored in the case of inherent time measurement inaccuracies, resulting in a 
simplified likelihood function in equation (178) which is demonstrated in Example 21. 
Recalling:  
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---(178) 
It can be seen that equation (178) is in fact equivalent to the likelihood in terms of observation 
method written in equation (173), where the observed evidence Ê  is equivalent to a set of failure 
detection times and the inherent inaccuracy: ˆÊ = t . 
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which is simply products of the likelihood function proposed by Tan and Xi in 
equation (173). 
7.5. SUMMARY 
The likelihood functions developed in previous chapters for both on-demand and continuous 
time based systems are generated from first principles and inherently deal with uncertainties 
contained with various evidence states. The derivation of each likelihood function is analogous 
with the likelihood in terms of observation method developed by Tan and Xi. Additionally, the 
inherent inaccuracies that exist in time measurement devices were exploited for the case of 
continuous time-based systems to generate a computationally efficient likelihood function. This 




Chapter 8: Sensor Placement: Maximising information from Bayesian 
analysis of complex systems 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of Bayesian analysis is the concept of improving state of knowledge and 
information. This is formally implemented by observing a process or system, gathering evidence 
and incorporating it through Bayes’ Theorem to modify a joint distribution of the ‘unknowns of 
interest’, representing the state of knowledge. Typically, improving information through 
Bayesian analysis is in itself the only desired outcome, but in some instances it may be beneficial 
to quantify the amount of information ‘improvement’ in a way that allows the engineer to assess 
the nature of information gathering for the purpose of improving it. Alternately, the form or 
nature that evidence is gathered may have constraints (such as resource, time or physical) where 
it may be desirable to assess the probable improvement of information. This can allow different 
forms of evidence to be compared against each other for the probable gains in information. 
Such an example for assessing the information gains from various forms of evidence gathering is 
posed by of overlapping data sets gathered from complex systems, as these sets are drawn from 
sensors whose placement may have some flexibility. An approach is developed in this chapter 




8.2. BAYESIAN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Bayesian Experimental Design provides a framework through which experiments can be 
assessed against the expected value of a utility function.  The utility function defines the ‘worth’ 
or ‘value’ of a particular experiment in a theoretical probabilistic Bayesian construct. Bayesian 
inference allows the utility function to incorporate both the meaning or information contained by 
observing a given set of evidence and any prior information that exists about the parameters or 
the unknowns of interest. [28] 
The term ‘experiment’ typically conjures ideas of expeditionary activities representing an 
exploration to improve overall state of knowledge of the system or process in question. It implies 
that a ‘test environment’ is established along with its own variables and constraints in order to 
gain information about relevant parameters. Thus, an experiment differs fundamentally from 
actual use, operation or natural occurrence of the process or system as the latter instances do not 
involve a contrived ‘test environment’. Whilst this may be a discussion on semantics, the 
problem posed by the question of employing sensors within a system to improve the value of the 
state of knowledge can be considered to exist within the realms of both experimentation and 
actual use. The reason being is that the system function within its operational environment is 
independent of sensor placement, and sensor placement can be completely controlled by the test 
engineer. 
Design of experiments historically focuses on the duration, size and conditions of test. However, 




hierarchy is not limited to the system design phase, and sensors can continue to be placed in 
optimal locations during operational use of the system without affecting overall functionality. In 
this way, experimentation can be considered (from certain points of view) to continue after the 
completion of design phases. Ultimately systems can always be changed or modified for certain 
resource investments, so the ability to influence designs never disappears. 
Recalling that Bayes’ theorem is written formally as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )





















 where θ is the set of unknowns of interest or parameters, π0(θ) is the prior distribution of θ 
representing the initial state of knowledge, L(E | θ) is the likelihood of observing a set of 
evidence, E, for a given θ, and π1(θ | E) is the updated posterior distribution of the set of 
unknowns of interest or parameters representing the updated state of knowledge. 
The nature of the evidence is inherently linked to the nature of the experiment and physical rules 
of observation. For example, if an experiment, ε1, involves testing the reliability of 10 
components and recording failure times, then the evidence set, E1, consists of failure times {t1 , 
t2 , … , t10}. If another experiment, ε2, involves testing the same 10 components but only 
observing their state after a test duration, T, then the evidence set, E2, consists of the number of 
failed and surviving components at time T, {FT , ST , T}, noting that FT + ST = 10. Each 




evidence sets. This is an often assumed aspect of the likelihood function, L(E | θ) and the 
experimental framework is rarely written explicitly.  
When this aspect of the likelihood function is not assumed and the experimental framework is 
denoted ε, then Bayes’ Theorem in equation (1) is more completely written as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )





















where ε is the framework (experimental or otherwise) through which the evidence E is 
gathered. 
The likelihood function in equation (187) can be written as either L(E | θ , ε) or Lε(E | θ). The 
discussion below follows steps extensively covered in literature on the topic such as Lindley 
[29]. The question that then arises is: ‘What experimental framework, ε, should be established in 
order to optimize the “value” of the experiment?’ This can be achieved by considering the 
probability of observing specific evidence sets based on the prior information of the parameter 
set θ. For example, if there is no uncertainty with the parameter set θ, (implying that all 
parameters are known), then it can be written 
 Pr(E | θ , ε) = the probability of observing evidence set E  ---(188) 




However, should these parameters be known with absolute certainty then there is no need to 
conduct an experiment. In reality, there is by definition uncertainty in the parameter set θ which 
is summarized by the prior distribution π0(θ). The probability of observing a given set of 
evidence becomes marginalized as it is a function of π0(θ) and the following can be written: 




θ θ θ θ  ---(189) 
noting that the symbol ‘π’ when used throughout this dissertation in isolation represent a 
joint probability density function of a set of unknowns of interest or parameters. 
Equation (189) allows the probability of observing specific instances of the evidence set E based 
on the experimental framework ε in the information context provided by prior information. 
8.3. UTILITY FUNCTION 
The utility function quantifies the ‘value’ of an experiment to the test engineer, and is designated 
with the symbol U. When the utility function is based on uncertainty or information, it is by 
definition derived from the nature of the ‘state of knowledge’ of the unknowns of interest. 
Therefore, information utility, UI, must be a function of the joint probability density function of 
all relevant unknowns of interest or parameters. 




When considering the information utility associated with an observed set of evidence, E, within 
an experimental framework, ε, the calculation is still derived from joint probability density 
functions. It can be based on the posterior distribution, π1(θ | E , ε), such as the information or 
uncertainty implied with prior knowledge, E and ε. Alternately, the information utility can be a 
comparison between the utilities of the posterior distribution and the prior distribution π0(θ). 
 i.e. Information utility of E and ε 
    ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 1 0, |   or  , |   or  |I I IU E U E Uε π ε π π π=   θ  ---(191) 
noting that E and ε given π0 defines π1 as per Bayes’ theorem in  
equation (187). 
The evidence set, E, is resultant from random processes, and thus is outside the control of the test 
engineer. However, the experimental framework, ε, is completely controlled by the test engineer, 
and in the context of complex systems consists of various arrangements of sensors within the 
system logic. It is therefore useful to attribute information utility to the experimental framework 
only. In the case of on-demand systems, there is only a set of discrete possible evidence sets, ˆ jE , 
meaning the information utility of an experimental framework is described by a discrete 
probability density function. 
i.e.  ( ) ( ) ( )0ˆPr Pr | ,I Ij j jf U U E ε π= =  ---(192) 
where IjU  is ( )0ˆ , |Ij jU E ε π , the information utility of the jth possible evidence set, ˆ jE , and 




The expected information utility, IU , can then be calculated by finding the mean of the 
distribution in equation (192): 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 0ˆ| Pr | ,
j
I I I I I
j j j j j
j
U U f U dU U Eε π ε π
∀∀
= • = •∑∫  ---(193) 
Substituting equation (189) into equation (193) yields equation (194). 
 ( ) ( )0 0ˆ| Pr | , ' ( ') 'I Ij j
j
U U E dε π ε π
∀ ∀
 




θ θ θ  ---(194) 
If the amount of information ‘improvement’ between prior and posterior distributions is 
valuable, then ( )0|IU ε π  would be constructed in a manner that it is maximized when this is 
achieved. The experimental framework with the highest expected utility then becomes the most 
‘valuable’ to the test engineer allowing optimization to occur. In some instances, it is possible for 
the utility of an experimental framework to be superior to all others for all possible prior 
distributions meaning that it is the optimal framework in any possible scenario [29]. 
8.4. INFORMATION OPTIMIZATION THROUGH INFORMATION UTILITY 
FUNCTIONS 
There is significant literature regarding the design of experiments to maximize information of 
parameters. Information can be viewed as the inverse of uncertainty. Typically, information is 




is considered optimal when the smallest possible variance is achieved. Two popular information 
metrics are listed below. 
8.4.1. Fisher Information.  
Explored by Fisher, the Fisher Information of a set of random variables with a joint probability 
distribution provides the lower bounds on variance and covariance. Maximizing Fisher 
Information therefore minimizes the variation of these random variables [30]. 
8.4.2. Shannon Information.  
Developed by Shannon [31], Shannon Information, described by Differential Entropy quantifies 
the uncertainty of a set of random variables with a joint probability distribution. Minimizing the 
differential entropy decreases the uncertainty or disorder, and hence increases information. 
Shannon introduced the concept of differential entropy in an influential paper which has been the 
basis of much subsequent analysis in the field of information theory [31]. Entropy is a measure 
of uncertainty associated with a random variable. Entropy of a discrete random variable is a non-
negative number where 0 represents total certainty, and is defined by: 




θ θ θ  ---(195) 





Entropy of a continuous random variable is more difficult to estimate as the limiting case of an 
increasingly discretized continuous probability distribution is always 0. Differential entropy of a 
continuous random variable is analogous to the entropy of a discrete random variable, but has 
several unique properties. For example, the differential entropy can have a negative value, and 
increasingly negative values represent increasing certainty. 




θ θ θ θ  ---(196) 
where h(θ) is the differential entropy of the continuous random variable set θ, and f(θ) is 
the probability density function of θ. 
The differential entropy defined in equation (196) can be estimated using techniques described in 
[32]. This metric can then be used to assess the uncertainty (and hence information) associated 
with a posterior distribution defined by Bayes’ Theorem. The units associated with differential 
entropy are dependent on the base of the logarithm in equation (196). The units are ‘nats’ when 
the natural logarithm is applied and will be the units used throughout this dissertation. 
A continuous random variable that involves less uncertainty (and hence more information) will 
have a lower differential entropy and can be used to assess the information associated with a 
posterior distribution defined by Bayes’ Theorem. The concept of marginal differential entropy 
will be introduced and used throughout this dissertation to assess the amount information a joint 
posterior distribution has about a particular parameter or sub-set of parameters (it is based on the 
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θ θ θ θ θ

   ---(197) 
where •θ  is the sub-set of continuous random variables that are being investigated, θ  is 
the remaining sub-set of continuous random variables which are not being investigated 
(making θ  the complement of •θ  and therefore θ = { •θ , θ}), hm( •θ ) is the marginal 
differential entropy of the sub-set of continuous random variable θ, and f(θ) is the 
probability density function of θ. 
8.5. INFORMATION UTILITY FUNCTION 
There are other information metrics within literature that have not been mentioned at this point 
as it is not the intent of this dissertation to advocate the use of any metric in particular. In any 
case, the test engineer conducts experimentation in order to gain information to make physical 
predictions with certain levels of confidence. The requisite levels of Fisher or Shannon 
Information for the relevant parameters to achieve this level of confidence would not be directly 
calculable. It may be that the confidence on the physical prediction represents the utility of the 
experimental framework. Using Fisher or Shannon Information to optimize experimental 
framework utility may be used by the test engineer as it is assumed it will improve the 
confidence of subsequent physical predictions, making the utility a subjective measurement. 
Optimization techniques focus on specific aspects of information metrics employed at the 




Once a relevant information metric has been determined, it then becomes the core of the utility 
function of a given evidence framework, ε. However, the following aspects of the utility function 
need to be considered: 
8.5.1. Information of the Posterior Distribution.  
The information of the posterior distribution represents the resultant information of the 
experiment, which involves both the prior information and the information gained by the 
experiment. 
8.5.2. Information difference of Posterior/Prior distributions.  
Much literature focuses on the information difference of posterior/prior distributions, as this 
represents the information gained by the experimental framework, ε. Lindley discusses this at 
length in regard to the information gain in Shannon Information throughout [29]. 
8.5.3. Information of specific parameters.  
It may be the case that information of certain parameters is more valuable than others or need to 
be treated differently. For instance, it may be desirable to optimize the minimum information of 
the parameter set (i.e. improve the information of the parameter with the lease prior information 
about it). It maybe that the test involves a system or process with many parameters, but one 





8.5.4. Information of variables that are functions of parameters.  
The physical relevance of parameters is once again, subjective. For example, it may be desirable 
to gain information about the time to failure of a particular component. This time to failure is 
itself a function of parameters and this may be the most relevant metric that is being investigated. 
The utility function can be determined based on these factors above. Several examples of 
information based utility functions for the purpose of optimizing experimental frameworks are 
included in Table 21. 
Utility Function Description 
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θ ~ θ  Inverse of the sum of the posterior 
variance of all parameters.  
 




8.6. SENSOR PLACEMENT 
Placing sensors within systems comes at sometimes significant resource costs. Physical 
limitations (such as volume and temperature) may impose constraints on the number and 
locations of sensors. It is suggested that the issue of sensor placement be considered a holistic 
multi-objective optimization problem, where the information utility is but one objective of many. 
Many techniques exist for multi-objective optimization (see Steuer [33]) but they will not be 
explored herein. 
The placement of sensors based on information optimality is necessarily complicated by many 
factors, each of which is addressed in the following proposed steps to optimize sensor placement 
for maximal information. 
8.6.1. Prior Information.  
The prior information of components affects information that sensors yield about all other 
components demonstrating the need for utility functions to be dependent on prior information in 
equations above. For example, if a basic two component series system comprising of 
components A and B has a system level sensor that detects high systemic failure probability and 
prior information suggesting that component A is very reliable, then the sensor evidence infers 
that component B is very unreliable. Conversely, if the prior information suggest component A is 
very unreliable, then minimal information is yielded about the reliability characteristics of 




8.6.2. Available Sensor Locations.  
Some systems cannot allow sensor to be located at all hierarchical positions within system logic. 
Potential sensor sites are typically limited through physical and environmental constraints. 
Whether part of a multi-objective optimization problem or otherwise, all possible sensor 
locations need to be identified. Wherever possible, the set ε should be minimized through the 
realization of any physical constraints of the system to limit computational time.  
 { }1 2 3, , ,...ε ε ε=ε  where ε i is a particular permutation of sensor locations. ---(198) 
8.6.3. Information Utility.  
The utility function needs to be selected, and could be any of the examples listed in Table 21. 
The utility function will be a condition function of the posterior distribution given the prior 
distribution of the unknowns of interest. 
( ) ( )0 1 0, |   or  |I IU E Uε π π π  ---(199) 
8.6.4. System Logic (Bayesian Analysis).  
If a sensor is not immediately ‘above’ a component when represented hierarchically, the system 
logic is required to generate inference about subordinate components. The amount of information 




8.6.5. Nature of the evidence.  
The evidence set can affect the amount of information gathered. The nature includes the size of 
the evidence set and the observation methodology. For example, should the sensors detect 
failure, then they may either record the time at which failure was detected or allow the test 
engineer to identify the failure of sub-systems on routine inspections. The first framework will 
yield exact failure times (T = t), while the latter will yield upper limits on failure times (T ≤/> t). 
For on-demand systems, evidence will always be of the form of k failures from r demands or 
equivalent. To assess the expected information utility of sensor placements, the number of 
demands, r, needs to be assumed. An outcome of an analysis of the nature of the evidence is 
naturally the likelihood function, ( )| ,L E εθ . 
8.6.6. Deriving structure functions.  
The state detected by each sensor is a function of the component state vector, x , which is a 
vector that contains the state of each component in the system. The output of the structure is the 
sensor information vector, Sx . 
i.e. { } ( )1 2, ,..., ,...,S S S S S Si mx x x x= =x x φ  ---(68) 
where Sφ  is the vector of the structure functions for all sensors, 1 2{ , ,..., ,..., }
S S S S




8.6.7. Simulation of evidence for on-demand systems. 
The possible evidence sets along with their probabilities need to be simulated from the prior 
distribution of unknowns of interest, π0(θ). There are multiple approaches to this, but an 
approach utilizing Monte-Carlo simulation is detailed below. 
a. Sampling unknowns of interest – θ. Monte-Carlo simulation can be used to randomly draw 
joint samples of the unknowns of interest. 
b. Simulation of component state vectors - x̂ . Each randomly drawn set of the unknowns of 
interest will define component state probabilities. Monte-Carlo simulation can then be used 
to randomly draw component state vectors. The resultant set of component state vectors is 
shown in equation (200). 
 { }1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ , , ,..., d=x x x x x        where d is the number of samples.   ---(200) 
noting that x̂  will probably contain multiple instances of the same component state 
vector. 
This set allows probabilities for all component state vectors to be estimated. 
 ( )0








c. Probabilities of sensor information vectors - ˆ Sx . Each component state vector, x̂ , will 
define a sensor information vector as shown in equation (68). The probability of each 
simulated sensor information vector is approximated in equation (202). 
 ( ) ( )0 0
ˆ ˆˆ( )










     ---(202) 
d. Sampling combinations of sensor information vectors – ˆSv . Monte-Carlo simulation using 
the probabilities for sensor information vectors given in (202) can be used to randomly 
draw combinations of sensor information vectors. The number of sensor information 
vectors in each combination is r, an assumed number of demands. 
 { }1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ , , ,...,S S S S Sd=v v v v v     ---(203) 
where d is the number of samples, and each combination of sensor information 
vectors, ˆSv , is defined in equation (204), noting that ˆ Sv  will probably contain 
multiple instances of the same combination of sensor information vectors. 
 
{ }1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,...S S S Sv v v=v  ---(204) 
where ˆSlv  is the number of times the sensor information vector ˆ
S
lx , appears in the 
combination ˆSv  noting that 1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ...




The probability of each combination of sensor information vectors, ˆSv , occurring can be 
approximated from equation (203). 
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ε π ≈ vvv

    ---(205) 
e. Simulation of evidence sets. Each combination, ˆSv , implies a particular evidence set, Ê . 
 { }1 2 3ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ , , ,..., ,...,S SS S S S Si mE =v vk k k k k        ---(206) 
where ˆÊ v  is the evidence set implied by the combination of sensor 
information vectors, ˆSv ; 
{ }(1) (2) (3) ( 1) ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,..., SS
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  is the vector of states detected by the ith sensor implied by the 




















  ---(208) 
where ( )ˆ Sl ix  is the i
th element of ˆ Slx , or the state implied by i
th sensor in the 




At this stage, the probabilities of all combinations of sensor information vectors, 
0
ˆPr( | , )S ε πv , have been approximated, and each possible evidence set, Ê , can be 
calculated as a function of ˆSv  through equations (206), (207) and (208). This allows the 
probability of possible evidence sets to be calculated as shown in equation (209). 
 ( ) ( )0 0
ˆ ˆˆ( )












  ---(209) 
where ˆ jE  is the j
th evidence set that is permissible from the entire set of simulated 
combinations of sensor information vectors, ˆ Sv . 
8.6.8. Simulation of evidence for continuous time based systems. 
The steps for continuous time based systems are analogous to those explored above for on-
demand systems. 
a. Sampling unknowns of interest – θ. Monte-Carlo simulation can be used to randomly draw 
joint samples of the unknowns of interest. 
b. Simulation of component failure times - t̂ . Each randomly drawn set of the unknowns of 
interest will define the time to failure probability distributions for each component. Monte-
Carlo simulation can then be used to randomly draw component failure times using the 
inverse (or approximate inverse) of each component’s CDF. These simulations will yield 




measurement accuracy, t̂∆ . For example, for a system with three components, randomly 
drawn times to failure {1.78462...  ,  9.34289...  ,  10.32791...} become {1.78 , 9.34 , 
10.33} for a measurement accuracy of ˆ 0.01t∆ = . This measurement accuracy can 
subjectively be made larger to limit the computational resources required in subsequent 
steps .The resultant set of component failure time vectors is shown in equation (210). 
  { }1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ , , ,..., d=t t t t t        where d is the number of samples.   ---(210) 
noting that t̂  will probably contain multiple instances of the same component 
failure time vector. 
This set allows probabilities for all component state vectors to be estimated. 
  ( )0




    ---(211) 
c. Probabilities of time to sensor failure detection vectors - ˆSt . Each component failure time 
vector, t̂ , will define a time to sensor failure detection vectors  ˆSt  based on system logic 
such as that represented in structure functions in equation (68). The probability of each 
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     ---(212) 
   noting that the simulated evidence set, Ê , is simply ˆSt . 
8.6.9. Simulation of posterior distributions.  
As discussed previously, the information utility of each simulated evidence set requires the 
posterior distribution of the unknowns of interest to be calculated. Each simulated posterior 
distribution is defined by Bayes’ Theorem: 






















8.6.10. Expected Information Utility.  
The information utility function in equation (199) along with the probability and posterior 
distribution of each evidence set,  equations (209) and (213) respectively can then be substituted 
into equation (193) to derive the expected information utility of the experimental framework, ε 




Example 22.  Expected information utility for various sensor placement arrangements for 
an on-demand system. 
Consider the binary-state on-demand system illustrated in Figure 49. A more detailed 
understanding of the unknowns of interest  (the component failure probabilities p1, p2 and p3) is 
desired but the placement of sensors within the system involves some costs. The system is always 
monitored at the ‘top-event’ level (i.e. systemic failure is always detected on occurrence) and 
there is scope to place additional sensors at the locations denoted ‘Possible Sensor #2’ and 
‘Possible Sensor #3’ in Figure 49. 
 
Figure 49: 4 component (3 component type) binary-state on-demand system 
In this instance, prior uniform distributions are assumed for all component failure probabilities. 
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The information utility used to assess the value of various sensor placements is selected to be the 
inverse of the sum of the posterior variance of all parameters (row three of Table 21) is 
developed in equation (215). 
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θ ~ θ   ---(215) 
The possible sensor arrangements are: 
 ε1 = {1} … (i.e. systemic level failure detection only) ---(216) 
 ε2 = {1,2} … (i.e. systemic level and sensor #2 failure detection) ---(217) 
 ε3 = {1,3} … (i.e. systemic level and sensor #3 failure detection) ---(218) 
 ε4 = {1,2,3} … (i.e. systemic level, sensor #2 and #3 failure detection) ---(219) 
The likelihood function for this on-demand system is expressed in equation (220), noting that a 
full explanation and demonstration of the likelihood function is included in previous chapters. 
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where the unknown of interest, p = {p1 , p2 , p3} is the set of 3 lower level component type 
failure probabilities, pjb is the failure probability of the b
th component (which is the failure 
probability of jbth component type), av  is the a
th combination of r state vectors (each state 




vector in av  and (xb)l is the state variable of the b
th component in the lth state vector. 
For the purposes of this scenario, the sensor placement information utility will be base on r = 5 
demands. The structure functions for each possible sensor location are based on where x1, x2, x3 
and x4 (the state variables of all four components), and are shown in equations (221), (222), and 
(223). 
 Sensor #1: ϕ1 = ϕ2 + x3x4 - ϕ2x3x4 ---(221) 
 Sensor #2: ϕ2 = ϕ3x2 ---(222) 
 Sensor #3: ϕ3 = x1 ---(223) 
Using on Monte-Carlo simulation, the set {p1 , p2 , p3} is drawn a large number of times based 
on the prior distribution in equation (214). Each draw defines the state probabilities of each 
component, each draw equivalent to a component state vector, x̂ . This process yields the 
component state vectors and their probabilities in Table 22. 

































Com 1: 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Com 2: 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Com 3: 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Com 4: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 




The dependence between the states of components 2 and 3 (which are the same component type) 
is clearly seen in Table 22. All state vectors where components 2 and 3 have the same state (i.e. 
either both 0 or both 1) have a higher probability of occurring. All other state vectors where the 
states of components 2 and 3 are different have a lower probability of occurring. This means that 
component 2 is more likely to be in the same state as that of component 3 and vice versa. This 
stems from a common failure probability, p2. 
Each component state vector generates a corresponding sensor information vector. Based on the 
data in Table 22, all possible sensor information vectors along with their probabilities can be 
calculated as shown in Table 23. 










ˆ Sx  
Sensor 1: 0 0 1 1 1 
Sensor 2: 0 0 1 0 0 
Sensor 3: 0 1 1 0 1 
Table 23: All possible sensor information vectors with probabilities of occurrence 
The sensor information vectors in Table 23 are used for Monte-Carlo Simulation of evidence 
sets, Ê . In this example, 100 000 simulations with 90 distinct evidence sets are generated. Each 
simulated evidence, set along with equation (220), can be substituted into equation (188) to yield 
a posterior distribution as shown in equation (213). The utility function for each posterior 
distribution is given in equation (215), which is simply the inverse of the sum of the variances of 
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1 0.065918 2 1 2 22.061 
2 0.054932 2 2 3 21.745 
3 0.054932 1 1 2 20.090 
4 0.048828 2 1 3 23.576 
5 0.047607 3 2 3 23.856 
6 0.045776 1 1 3 21.104 
7 0.032959 2 1 1 21.972 
8 0.032959 2 2 2 22.884 
9 0.032959 3 2 2 23.800 
10 0.032043 1 0 2 23.912 
…  
Table 24: Possible evidence sets with probabilities of occurrence (10 most probable of 90 
evidence sets simulated) 
Equation (193) can then be used to generate the expected utility of the sensor placement 
arrangement. This is demonstrated in equation (224) for sensor arrangement ε4. 
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 ---(224) 
The same process is used for all other sensor arrangements. The resultant expected utility for 










Table 25: Expected information utility for each sensor arrangement. 
It can be seen that as expected, using all three possible sensor locations yields the most 
information. However, if the total number of sensors that could be used is limited to two, than it 
is clearly most beneficial for locations 1 and 3 to be used, as opposed to locations 1 and 2. This is 
because sensors at locations 1 and 3 can still yield significant information about component 2 in 
addition to yielding more detailed information about component 1. 
Example 23. Expected information utility for various sensor placement arrangements for a 
continuous time-based system. 
Consider the same binary-state on-demand system illustrated in Figure 49 in Example 22, 
however the system is now continuous, time based. Only one sensor can be placed on the system: 
sensor #1 location (for a cost of $1 000) or sensor #2 location (for a cost of $ 100). Component A 
has a constant failure rate, λ1. Components B and C have a constant failure rate, λ2. Component 
D’s time to failure is described by a normal distribution with mean μ3 and standard deviation σ3. 
The set of unknowns of interest is listed in equation (225). 




Prior information consists of limits on the parameters in (226), (227) and (228); and the Bayesian 
inference of a single test with evidence in equation (229). 
 [ ]1 2 and ~ 0,10λ λ  ... [ ]3 ~ 10,15µ  ... [ ]3 ~ 0,5σ  ---(226)(227)(228) 
 { }1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0.8, 0.7, 0.5S S SE t t t= = = =
 
... noting that the timing uncertainty is ∆t = 0.1 ---(229) 
The resulting state of knowledge yields has marginal distributions for the unknowns of interest 
illustrated in Figure 50. 
 
Figure 50: Marginal distributions of the unknowns of interest generated by our current state of 
knowledge (prior distributions from equations (226), (227), (228) and evidence set (229)). 
Component  F failure rate , ( λ F ) 
Component  G failure rate , ( λ G ) 
Component  H mean time to failure , ( µ H ) 



















The same state of knowledge yields the following time to failure distributions for each 
component, illustrated in Figure 51. 
 
Figure 51: Time to failure distributions for components 1, 2, 3 and 4 based on the state of 
knowledge represented in Figure 50. 
The information utility used to assess the value of various sensor placements is selected to be the 
inverse of the sum of the posterior variance of all parameters (row three of Table 21): 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 0 1
2
1





U E U E
θ





θ ~ θ   ---(230) 
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 ε1 = {1} … (i.e. systemic level failure detection only) ---(231) 
 ε2 = {2} … (i.e. sensor #2 failure detection) ---(232) 
From chapter 7, the likelihood function for this on-demand system is expressed below. 
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where Δt is the time increment used in measuring time to failure detection, ˆSt  (as opposed 
to St ) represents the vector of failure detection times with an inherent uncertainty, ∆t, and 
ˆ S
i
⊂t  is the set of all uncertain failure detection times of sensors that are inferentially 
subordinate to the ith sensor (i.e. the failure detection times of all sensors ∈ Si
⊂S ). 
The structure functions for each possible sensor location remain unchanged from Example 22 
where failure probabilities can be used in place of state variables (not all structure functions can 
use failure probabilities, but those in Example 22 are constructed to allow this to happen). 
Using Monte-Carlo simulation, the set {λ1 , λ2 , μ3 , σ3} is drawn a large number of times based 




Each draw defines the PDF and CDF of each component. This allows component failure times 
and hence sensor failure detection times, ˆSit , to be randomly drawn again. This process yields the 
simulated sensor detection times for each sensor placement arrangement in Table 26, using an 
assumed time measurement accuracy of ˆ 0.5t∆ = . 
ε1 = {1} … Sensor# 1  ε2 = {2} … Sensor # 2 
Failure Detection Time ( )1 0ˆPr | ,St ε π ≈  Failure Detection Time ( )2 0ˆPr | ,St ε π ≈  
1̂0 0.5
St≤ <  0.4373 2̂0 0.5St≤ <  0.4369 
1̂0.5 1.0
St≤ <  0.2517 2̂0.5 1.0St≤ <  0.251 
1̂1.0 1.5
St≤ <  0.1172 2̂1.0 1.5St≤ <  0.1172 
1̂1.5 2.0
St≤ <  0.0618 2̂1.5 2.0St≤ <  0.0618 
1̂2.0 2.5
St≤ <  0.0363 2̂2.0 2.5St≤ <  0.0364 
… … … … 
Table 26: Simulated failure detection times based on current state of knowledge (five most 
probable evidence sets displayed … based on 100 000 simulations) 
Each simulated evidence set along with equation (178) can be substituted into equation (188) to 
yield a posterior distribution. The utility function for each posterior distribution is given in 
equation (230). Equation (193) can then be used to generate the expected utility of each sensor 
placement arrangement, and the data is summarized in Table 27. 
ε i Expected Information Utility, ( )0|I iU ε π  
{1} 1.141 
{2} 1.128 




It can be seen that the expected utility for each sensor is very similar. This is because based on 
our current state of knowledge, component 4 will almost certainly fail after all of the other 
components (as illustrated in Figure 51). Therefore, sensors at locations 1 and 2 will almost 
certainly detect failure at the same time due to the system logic. The sensor at location 1 has 
higher expected information utility as it is predicated on the nature of component 4, and in effect 
is improving the understanding of the component 4 failure characteristics as it will suggest that 
component 4 hasn’t failed when sensor #2 would otherwise detect failure. The sensor at location 
2 yields information directly onto the remaining 3 components only.  
Notwithstanding the slight difference in information utility, the cost of installing a sensor at the 
second possible location is significantly less than that for the first possible location. Therefore, it 
is probably most valuable (in both an information utility and cost/benefit perspective) to install 
the sensor at the second possible location. 
8.7. SUMMARY 
Optimizing experimental design is a well documented and researched topic, and is used in a wide 
array of applications such as dynamic systems to neuroscience. [34, 35] The ability to maximize 
the expected gain of information through constraining the data gathering process in specific ways 
is generally desirable. With concepts developed in this dissertation that allow Bayesian analysis 
of overlapping data drawn from  systems with multiple sensors, the concept of experimental 
design (often associated with research and development) can extend to the act of sensor 




Presented in this chapter is a method of measuring the information utility of various sensor 
placement arrangements in a Bayesian construct of both on-demand and time based continuous 
systems. Prior information is used to simulate evidence sets, which are then used to simulate 
posterior distributions. Information utility is derived from these posterior distributions, and an 
expected information utility can then be attributed to sensor placement. An example was 





Chapter 9: Conclusion 
The fundamental problem that this dissertation addresses is the reliability analysis of multiple 
overlapping data sets that are simultaneously drawn from the same system or process.  
9.1. OVERLAPPING-DATA 
It is often the case that higher level data sets that are used to assess lower level parameters of 
systems will be overlapping or dependent in nature. For instance, if the data is derived at various 
component, sub-system and assembly levels from the same system at the same time, they are 
overlapping. Furthermore, there may be relationships between higher level data and multiple 
manifestations of the same lower level parameter. Such instances demand special considerations 
and concepts in order to fully infer all aspects of available information. Chapter 1 explains why 
data sets from the same system drawn simultaneously are fundamentally different to their non-
simultaneous counterparts through introducing and examining the concept of overlapping data. 
Sets of overlapping data need to meet the following criteria: 
a. Simultaneity - the data sets occur at the same time; and 
b. Correspondence – the data sets are resultant from the same system or process. 
Chapter 2 outlined how in the context of Bayesian analysis of data sets drawn from multiple 
sensors from the same system, the majority of previous techniques centred around on-demand 




methodologies have been developed to incorporate data at various levels within on-demand 
systems, all but one has been constrained to treat all data as non-overlapping. The single latter 
technique is limited to binary-state on-demand systems and is prescriptive in terms of the type of 
data it can draw. Treating overlapping data as non-overlapping ignores the dependencies 
between the data sets and effectively removes inherent information.  
9.2. OVERLAPPING DATA ANALYSIS 
Chapters 3 to 7 developed methodologies to analyse overlapping data on various system 
scenarios. Several examples were developed to highlight the effect of the additional information 
overlapping data sets contain and how it can be used to correctly improve the state of knowledge 
(which is the set of component reliability characteristics). The flexibility of the likelihood 
functions were also generalised to incorporate multiple instances of the same component 
occurring in the system. Through state of knowledge dependence, the resultant Bayesian 
overlapping data method completely incorporates all information and evidence that can possible 
be generated or observed by complex systems.  
9.2.1. Binary-state on-demand systems 
Chapter 3 dealt with overlapping data analysis of binary-state on–demand systems. On-demand 
systems, where components are considered to be either ‘functional’ or ‘failed’, had a likelihood 
function developed to allow incorporation of overlapping data into Bayesian analysis.




The likelihood function in equation (53) allows complete generalisation of the evidence: all that 
is needed is the total number of demands the system is subjected to, and the total number of 
failures observed at each sensor. This generalisation separates it from all other techniques and 
makes it the most flexible. 
9.2.2. Multi-state on-demand systems 
Chapter 4 covered a methodology to deal with overlapping data from multi-state on-demand 
systems. Multi-state on-demand systems where components are considered to be ‘functional’, 
‘failed’, or one of any number of degraded states in between utilise the following likelihood 
function for Bayesian analysis of overlapping higher-level data. The same property that is 
observed in the likelihood function for binary-state on-demand systems (that of evidence 
generalisation) is also observed in equation (64). The evidence can be of the form of total 
demands the system is subjected to, and the total numbers of particular states observed at each 
sensor. 
9.2.3. Overlapping  data analysis of on-demand systems: Algorithm 
Chapter 5 outlined the algorithm that rapidly solves the likelihood functions in equations (53) 
and (64). Both functions revolve around the generation of combinations of component state 
vectors that match the evidence and subsequently calculate the sum of the probabilities of each. 
The number of possible combinations that must be considered increases exponentially as the 




The algorithm instead considers sensor information vectors instead of component state vectors, 
By doing this, it exploits the fact that there will always be fewer sensors than components, and 
hence fewer combinations to consider. Sets of constraints and limits are generated, thereby 
creating a rule based of systemic rejection of each sensor information vector. An example was 
developed where the algorithm simplified the solution of the likelihood function by being able to 
consider 9 different combinations of 4 sensor information vectors as opposed to the completely 
trivial method of individual consideration of a possible 3 724 680 960 combinations of 10. 
9.2.4. Continuous Life Metric Systems 
Continuous time-based systems were considered in chapter 6 where components whose time to 
failure is a random variable utilise the following likelihood function for Bayesian analysis of 
overlapping higher-level data. Whilst the term ‘time-based’ was used, the methodology is 
equally applicable to a system with any continuous life metric (such as distance). The 
methodology is based on considering each sensor in isolation, where subordinate sensor data is 
used to contextualise the failure data of each sensor in question. 
9.3. BAYESIAN ANALYSIS OF UNCERTAIN DATA 
Chapter 7 dealt with generalising the likelihood functions developed above to incorporate 
uncertain data, thereby realising several computational efficiencies. Several existing 
methodologies for Bayesian analysis of uncertain data were examined. Each methodology relied 
on a probabilistic relationship between observed and actual evidence. This relationship (or error) 




9.3.1. On-demand systems 
This examination found that the likelihood functions in equations (53) and (64) inherently 
involve classical error in their derivation, which is the conditional probability of observing a 
specific evidence set based on the actual evidence set.  
9.3.2. Continuous time-based systems 
The examination of Bayesian analysis of uncertain data for continuous time-based systems 
allowed exploitation of the inherent inaccuracies that always exist in measurement devices (such 
as the accuracy of a clock or timer). The likelihood function in equation (178) is based on 
uncertain data for continuous time-based systems that not only reflects the reality of inherent 
timing inaccuracies for all timing devices, but is much more computationally efficient. 
9.4. SENSOR PLACEMENT: MAXIMISING INFORMATION FROM BAYESIAN 
ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
At the heart of Bayesian analysis is the concept of updating or improving state of knowledge or 
information. This is formally implemented by observing a process or system, gathering evidence 
and incorporating it through Bayes’ Theorem to modify a joint distribution of the ‘unknowns of 
interest. Typically, improving information through Bayesian analysis is in itself the only desired 
outcome. However, in some instances it may be beneficial to quantify the amount of information 
‘improvement’. Reliability data can be gathered by placing sensors at various levels or places 




the number and locations of these sensors. It may be beneficial to assess the probable 
improvement in information based on various permutations of sensor placement. 
9.4.1. Bayesian Experimental Design 
Bayesian Experimental Design provides a framework through which permutations of sensor 
locations can be assessed against the expected value of a utility function. The utility function 
defines the ‘worth’ or ‘value’ of a particular permutation in a theoretical probabilistic Bayesian 
construct. Bayesian inference allows the utility function to incorporate both the meaning or 
information contained by observing a given set of evidence and any prior information that exists 
about the parameters or the unknowns of interest. This allows a robust approach to be taken to 
sensor placement in complex systems that incorporate implied information within overlapping 
data sets, permitting the engineer to make an informed decision about sensor location. 
9.5. FURTHER WORK 
The methodologies covered within this dissertation can be developed further in the following 
ways or fields: 
a. Overlapping environmental data. The data considered has been strictly limited to 
reliability data. It is possible that overlapping environmental data (such as 




b. Multi-state continuous life metric systems. The methodology developed in chapter 6 
is limited to binary-state continuous life metric systems. Further generalisation to 
multi-state systems has not been developed. 
c. Uncertain data analysis of continuous life metric systems: inconsistent measurement 
inaccuracies. The methodology considered in chapter 7 where inaccuracies in life 
metrics are incorporated (such as the tolerance of a digital stopwatch) require these 
inaccuracies to be uniform. However, further development could allow analysis 
where the inaccuracies vary across sensors. 
d. Network and chain modelling analysis. Bayesian belief networks (BBN) and Markov 
Chains were not modelling methodologies considered in this dissertation. These 
methodologies (which are generally used for multi-state continuous life metric 







Consider a likelihood function of the form shown in equation (A1). 








L E x B A
dx=
−
= + ∑  ---(A1) 
 where Ai and B are functions of x (for i = 1 … n), the evidence set E = {x1 , x2 , … , xi} 
and H(x) is the Heaviside step function (which is defined as 0 when x < 0, and 1 when  
x > 0). 
By definition, the derivative of the H(x) is 0 when x ≠ 0, as H(x) is constant in this region. 
Therefore, the terms in the summation in equation (A1) where x ≠ xi can be excluded. 
i.e. ( ) ( )| ii
i
dH x x






 where { }i= ∀i  such that x = xi. 
Therefore, if = ∅i  (i.e. there are no instances where x = xi) or Ai = 0 for all i ∈ i , then the 
likelihood function reduces to: 




Otherwise, more manipulation is required. A centralized definition for a derivative is 
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Therefore, equation (A1) can be rewritten as 
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When evaluated in isolation, equation (A5) is undefined. However, the normalizing factor of 
Bayes’ Theorem can be exploited. Substituting equation (A3) into Bayes’ Theorem yields: 
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It can be seen from inspection of equation (A6) that the likelihood function is now equivalent to 
the sum of all Ai where x = xi. Therefore, the likelihood function written in equation (A1) can be 
expressed as equivalence when used in Bayesian Analysis: 
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